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Seven Calamities But Not a Single Answer

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[Article by Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences and academician-secretary of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The well-known Russian saying states that there are seven calamities but a single answer [the English equivalent of in for a penny, in for a pound]. In reviewing the history of our social sciences, its current state and prospects, I cannot fully agree with this folk wisdom. The calamitous state of the social and humanitarian sciences cannot be explained uniformly as each misfortune has its own roots, its own genesis.

What, in my view, have been the calamities of the social sciences, what have been their causes and is there any hope of improvement? Certainly, I in no way consider my judgments indisputable.

The first calamity is also probably the main one. It resides in us ourselves, the social scientists. At one time, we did not show proper effort, principledness, if you wish, boldness in examining the most pertinent and acute problems of society. And now they, not promptly resolved, are making themselves felt with unprecedented acuteness.

The same nationality problems, as an example. Tragedies are occurring in the ethnic clashes and hundreds and thousands of people are perishing, homes are being destroyed and property annihilated which was built up by hard effort over the years and decades.

At present, in our nation there is no guarantee for human life. There is no certainty of tomorrow. What awaits us? A merciless market which has been termed by one of the most fashionable and prosperous economists as the "ruler" of all? How have we reached such a life? Are the social scientists to blame for this?

Yes, they are somewhat to blame. Undoubtedly, there have always been scientists for whom the truth is more precious than all. However, they did not make the weather in social sciences. Why was this? There were various reasons.

Some were simply cowardly, they buried their heads in the sand, they thought or pretended that their could be no higher scientific apex than, for instance, the Stalinist party history. They lacked the spirit to protest and prove that things were far from being as the "leader of all times and peoples" professed.

Yes, Stalin caused enormous harm to the social sciences as he refashioned history for his own cult, he turned philosophy, economic and other sciences into dogma, he made them into the lackeys of antipopular policy and he physically exterminated a number of talented social scientists. He put the fear of God in others and crushed any interest in thinking independently.

During the times of stagnation, there were also very strong pressure "from above" and great dangers for the dissidents. For dissidence you could be put in jail, exiled or sent to a

psychiatric hospital. You had to give some thought for your children and grandchildren. Not to mention such a "minor detail" as the fear of losing one's cozy place. And now some of those who, in fawning obsequiously, sat silently next to the marble fireplace at a grand dacha outside of Moscow, praising in vaunted iambs and trochees the booklets and stars of the General Secretary of stagnation, and have become the extra-bold supporters of perestroika and the ultraradicals. And here they have understood perestroika in a very unique manner, reducing it, in using the words of V.I. Lenin, to a "naked," "useless" negation of all and everything.

I would say that all the same there was a minority among the scientists of cowards and unprecedented yes-men for the directives "from above." A majority (and I consider myself among it) sincerely believed and continue to believe in all sorts of programs, decrees and codes, laws and ukases which were numerous before and are now infinite.

Being the editor-in-chief of PRAVDA for 30 years, I believed and obeyed. At times, I protested but not with any particular success. I did attack a number of bigwigs. And for the article by T. Samolis entitled "Purge" of 13 February 1986 (this was already the period of perestroika), I merited criticism at the 27th CPSU Congress from the mouth of Ye.K. Ligachev. I also systematically received, in the Chinese fashion, the "last serious warnings" of M.S. Gorbachev. For the fact that we had hauled over the coals the "first leaders," the Bashkir Shakirov, the Volgograd Kalashnikov and for some other things.

Incidentally, the former orthodox PRAVDA writer V. Somov, having quickly made his way to the Moscow KURANTY where they pay significantly more than at PRAVDA, has misled the readers, asserting that we criticized the party leaders by "license" from Nogin Square. There was nothing of the sort as we were acting out of our conscience, out of conviction, at our risk and peril. This would be confirmed by any from the collective of PRAVDA employees with whom I worked for many years.

The pressure applied to social scientists at present has lessened sharply but still is operating. And not in the direct sense (at present, anyone says and writes whatever comes into his head). But rather in the sense that this pressure developed in us our own inner sensor and the habit of monitoring and limiting our views.

We, the social scientists, were not up to the modern level also because we were not properly taught. We were taught only Marxism-Leninism without becoming acquainted with the spiritual values of the fatherland and world civilization. As an academician, I am ashamed to admit that I studied Russian philosophy only following Belinskiy and Herzen, Chernyshevskiy and Dobrolyubov. But strictly speaking, they were not professional philosophers. And I am just now becoming familiar with the works of Florenskiy, V. Solov'ev, Berdyayev and other Russian philosophers. What have I assimilated from the sociophilosophical thought of the West? Only our critical attitude toward positivism and neopositivism, pragmatism, existentialism, Freudianism, as well as for the various theories of modern sociology and social psychology. Alas, I was not taught foreign languages

either in school or particularly in the Soviet Army where I dedicated my best, young years. Naturally, I could not read the foreign treatises on the "nature of things." And what I find particularly sorrowful: I know a number of doctors of philosophy who, in having a mastery of languages, boldly have rewritten the books of Western authors. They have adopted the intelligent thoughts as their own, they have criticized the debatable ones and chiefly by quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

And so this lack of education of our social scientists is still another, *second calamity* for them.

The third calamity is that we have been constantly fighting, either against cybernetics, against genetics or against sociology.... And now we are fighting...ourselves. We are divided by the dominance of groups, by a certain implacability and a reticence to listen to one another and to seek out the truth jointly. Is it not time to come together under one, the sole scientific flag of the truth? Precisely it [truth] is the main goal of science and we are obliged to serve it honestly and conscientiously. For the sake of its triumph we are obliged to disdain discord and abandon group interests and personal ambition. The question of the truth cannot be resolved at large meetings or by voting. For the sake of the triumph of truth, we must learn to create, to care and to constantly correlate even the highest theories against practice. Such a correlation and a testing of the theory by practice is still another hope for the social scientists.

There is no getting around it, it is difficult to learn. But if we, the social scientists, philosophers and sociologists, want to be on the level of our times, then we should, we must reeducate ourselves. Not in the sense of abandoning fundamental principles on the basis of which we live, but rather we must possess at least the minimal amount of spiritual wealth produced by mankind.

In constant study, in improving our knowledge and in raising our spiritual culture, I see a source for the rebirth and strengthening of the dignity of natural sciences and a hope for their bright future.

The fourth calamity. The social scientists do not have available the figures, facts and documents, or to put it in other terms, the archives and statistics, which are indispensable for disclosing trends and patterns, for making comparisons, correlations and forecasts. What has gone on in our country, how we lived and breathed, what our successes and failures were (these also did exist and still do but, unfortunately, our sharp press has not pointed them out or has simply not wanted to see them) we have learned and even now are learning often not from our own but rather from foreign sources. This is a paradox and for social science it is simply a drama as "they" know more about "us" than we do about ourselves. For this reason, it is no accident that immeasurably more has been written in the West than in our own nation about our history, our current economy, philosophy, sociology, about our ordinary life and, finally, about our great sadnesses and small joys which have marked the so difficult years of perestroika. There have been books, not to mention infinite articles in newspapers and journals.

In our times, regardless of the bombastic statements about the triumph of glasnost, there still are many closed areas for the public and for the researchers. Even now the social scientists do not possess the necessary and sufficient information. The compilers of the 500 Days Program, for example, complained that many ministries and departments, including the key ones, did not provide them with the required information. The program writers often lack data on the actual resources which our nation possesses including raw material, foreign exchange, gold and labor. Is it possible to work out an anyway realistic program without reliable information and without an inventorying of what we possess? Has not this been one of the main reasons for the failure of many of our socioeconomic programs?

And so our superior leadership wavers from one program to another, trying to find a certain golden mean. And although it has put superior academic science in its service, for now there has been little benefit. Science is impotent if it is guided by declarations, by "basic directions" and by promises. Sciences needs reliable facts, figures and documents.

We have forgotten the great victory of science linked inseparably with the name of K. Marx, that is, a systems approach to the study and practical transformation of reality. Here lies the *fifth calamity* of social science.

This approach presupposes the precise definition of the goal which confronts society or any subsystem within it, be it the economy, the political and social sphere or spiritual life; consideration of the state and the readiness of the system to achieve the set goal, defining the ways, means and times for achieving it, the responsibility of the organizations and individuals for achieving the goal; ascertaining the role of the environment surrounding the system (domestic and international) in order to utilize its favorable factors and if not to neutralize at least mitigate the unfavorable factors. Certainly the most important thing is, in taking any decision, it is essential to envisage as accurately as possible its consequences not only in the near term but also the distant. In other words, it is essential to foresee and forecast.

Our social scientists have lost this focus which is essential to a science concerned with society. The school of scientific forecasting for social processes at one time was dispersed and up to the present, at least in social science, there is no solid dependable forecasting service. As a result, it turns out that a decision taken after a very short segment of time causes a real headache, not for the individual but for all society.

The very antialcohol campaign which economically (many tens of billions of rubles of losses), politically (hostility for the party and the government on the part of millions of Soviet people) and socially (savage speculation in alcohol, an outburst of drug addiction, crime and so forth) to an ever-greater degree is disrupting our already disrupted society.

There are many similar examples.

In this context, I would venture to say that the main reason for the lack of progress during the first 5 years of perestroika has been in the forgetting and ignoring of a systems approach to the study and transforming of society. We have not sketched in a general, systems picture of renewal, having

limited ourselves to the abstract formula of moving from totalitarian socialism ("administrative-command," "military communist," "feudal," "deformed," "state capitalistic" and so forth) to a "humane, democratic" one.

From the viewpoint of science, such an interpretation of the initial and final points in the development of Soviet society is at least incorrect. I would call our socialism early, embryonic, "so-called socialism," in the expression of V.I. Lenin. This is the initial point. And the final one, although the dialectics does not know an "end," is a communist society in the classic Marxist understanding.

If one were to follow the requirements of a systems method, in the complex aggregate of tasks confronting us, we would have to isolate the basic element the taking up of which could (again according to V.I. Lenin) resolve the aggregate of tasks confronting society. But no thought was given to this. They took up everything all at once. And on this score, in addition to our own domestic experience, there is also international. Particularly valuable for us, in my view, is the practice of carrying out the reform in China. There they started with agriculture, and decided initially to be able to feed a people of over a billion and then settle other problems.

The conclusion arises that our social science must restore and institute a systems approach to the investigation of reality particularly as the natural scientists are our allies in this. Secondly, it is essential that the politicians and the leaders—from the president down to the deputies of various levels—learn to think and work in a systems manner. Otherwise, we will only make the situation worse and will follow the lethal trial-and-error method or the firefighter's principle of putting things out where they are already burning. In essence, everything is burning but we still lack firefighters.

To restore, develop and root a systems approach, to make it an indispensable guide to action, and to strengthen the alliance of natural scientists, social scientists and politicians are yet another hope for the rebirth of social sciences and for raising its vestige and role in the society of perestroika.

The sixth calamity is that at present the Soviet nation does not have stability and anarchy reigns in it. For us, as the President wisely put it, it is possible to do everything that is not prohibited. But since a precise system of laws has still not been developed (a law is always a prohibition, restriction or regulation), while those which do exist are not carried out, in practical terms everything is permitted and the nation is sinking into chaos. The pictures of our nation's life flash by as in a kaleidoscope and in this flashing, in this unusually quick change of events, it is difficult to seek out the laws which are the goal and subject of science.

Just try to find in our society something general, essential, necessary and repeating. You will scarcely be able to. And all because we are living through a transitional period and any transition from one quality to another is characterized by an ambiguity, when the patterns of the old state of society have not yet "left" the historical stage and the patterns of the new state have not assumed their dominant position on this same stage.

In the economic area, a centralized planning system prevails, state property is unchallenged and market relations are making just their first, timid steps. Often this is done contrary to the law in the form of the shadow economy and the in no way civilized cooperation.

In the political area, the command-administrative, bureaucratic system of power and administration is still strong as a democratic multiparty system and the freedom of political choice have not yet been affirmed.

In the spiritual area an institutionalized science is still prevalent while a pluralism of opinions is creakingly gaining force. This "creak" often assumes a certainly not civilized form.

What can the social scientists do under these conditions of ambiguity and unpredictability organically inherent to a transitional period? How and where is it possible to find the necessary, general and repeating links?

Some have endeavored to seek them out in history. In defaming Russia, they seek to prove that our misfortunes go back deep into the ages, to almost Ivan the Terrible, not to mention Peter I. They supposedly were the forerunners of dictatorship and terror. Other "chroniclers" have endeavored to show that October 1917 was to blame for the Stalin reign and everything related to it.

On this level we find interesting, instructive and somehow typical for the social sciences of our times the article by V. Mau and I. Starodubrovskaya¹ and which compares our times with two great revolutions, the French Revolution of the 18th Century and the Russian Revolution at the beginning of the 20th Century, and attempts to predict the possible course and results of perestroika. Without any doubt analogy is far from the last method in science, particularly in social science. But the hitch is that the author of the mentioned article on the basis of it very strongly urge us to go back, to capitalism, to the dominance of private ownership with all its known consequences. I can anticipate that the authors would grow indignant and accuse me of "denunciation," not to mention conservatism (at present, this is very, very fashionable and prestigious).

There are many such political and scholarly opuses. It is a useless and in some places even a dangerous undertaking to argue back against their authors. I do not want to remind them that of the approximately 120 nations living under a market economy, not more than 20 are flourishing and only relatively so. Let me recall also that this economy was established there over decades if not hundreds of years. And how many profound crises, tragedies and wars accompanied its birth!

They have endeavored to convince us that in just a year or 18 months we will establish (by a presidential or USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase) a viable market which will free society from numerous calamities. Here they ignore the numerous comments of not only our own but also foreign scientists who caution about its dangers.

Now about the *seventh calamity*. Its essence is that over the decades many and far from the worst of the social scientists

were not concerned at all with science. Far from the problems of the management of production and the administration of society, the efficient organization of the national economy and labor, or a profound study of the social structure of society, nationality relations and in the breast of which there glowed the embers of conflicts which have now burst forth into the bloody flames of interethnic and ethnic wars. They were not concerned with the problems of the development of democracy and the formation of culture. Nor were they concerned with a state under the law, let alone the problems of a civil society about which, to put it frankly, we know little.

Under N.S. Khrushchev the social scientists conjectured about how they could realize the chimeral idea of "the full-scale construction of communism." Khrushchev was removed and his times were declared one of voluntarism.

Under L.I. Brezhnev, they (myself included) extolled "developed socialism, they eulogized this unprecedented level of social development, they built on sand radical economic reforms and dreamed up victorious relations. The General Secretary departed from life and his age was declared one of stagnation.

In the mid-1980s, they proclaimed initially an acceleration and then a restructuring (we are still restructuring at present). The next, now styled revolutionary reform in the economy is being carried out and the essence of this is the rehabilitation of private property and the elevating of entrepreneurship and greed to the level of a cult. I wish Gorbachev good health and a long life but even during his lifetime and age has been called a period of collapse and profound crisis in Soviet society (incidentally, he himself admits this).

What are we, the social scientists, to do?

The first and most important thing which must be done is to free science from the ideological blinders, from the dictating of terms from above and make it free and serving its sole God, the truth. Ideology is a system of views inherent to a certain class, nation, a social group or a certain person, even a great one. But scientific truth is higher than all these ideological views. It is the same for all and it is common to all mankind. And practice is the only proof of the truth.

Seemingly the first steps to this have been taken. On 23 August 1990, by an ukase of the USSR President, the USSR Academy of Sciences was proclaimed to be an independent public organization free of the state. It was to be self-governing and was to be guided solely by its Bylaws and the USSR laws. It was given its own property.

But like many of the other presidential ukases, there are few who carry it out. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet, for example, is in no hurry to surrender the property belonging to the USSR Academy. And without its own property it cannot even think about freedom, independence from the state, a certain deideologization and so forth.

I am not to the slightest degree abandoning the ideology of Marxism. I imbibed it in my "mother's milk," a communist of Lenin's time. I do not see a society which would instill in me, in my children and my grandchildren a belief in a bright future other than true socialism and communism. But

clearly my generation which is past its time must live through the tortures of hell in order that our distant offspring possibly will achieve this future.

As for now.... As for now, practice shows that we are on our way to it and have not always followed the correct path.

Modern progress in production, science and technology is passing us by and as a result the great power is giving up its positions.

This can be prevented primarily by work, completely conscientious, diligent and creative, and which has always marked our people. Work which the people have lost the habit of in recent (perestroika) years with the empty shelves, the savage mismanagement, social disorganization and the absence of even the slightest hint of an anyway better future.

This can be prevented by the great intellectual potential of the nation and here the USSR Academy of Sciences is the highest expression and embodiment. In our perestroika rush, when virtually everything is collapsing and almost nothing is being created, the academy is steadfast and unshakable. It is alive, it is working and thinking. I bow to the veterans of the Academy and those members of it who are younger for the fact that they steadily, energetically, without hysteria and excessive emotions by their actions prove its right to life and defend its honor and dignity.

I have been angered to the depths of my soul by the attacks on the Academy over the slightest pretext and most often without any grounds at all by various radicals on the "left" and "right." Do these ultrasupporters of perestroika really not understand that academy science represents a tight nexus of the people's mind and spirit and that without great science there also can be no great society.

In line with the transition to a market, our science, particularly academy science, will be confronted by difficult hardships, including the danger of commercialization and privatization. But I am confident that under any conditions society will not forget for a second that simple truth that academy science does not cost so much but is valued very highly.

Our future lies in science. Certainly it, and not excluding social science, must have profound reforms. These are being carried out, although certainly not as one would like. But certainly haste makes waste. And science certainly cannot and should not be a matter of mirth.

It is essential to alter the orientation of the social sciences, having focused on the research of the transitional period which Soviet society is living through, the ways and methods of the movement toward market relations as well as forecasting the economic and sociopolitical consequences of this process. It is essential to improve the organization and management of science and activate its links with the world scientific community. But this is a matter of separate discussion.

Footnote

1. Mau, V., Starodubovskaya, I., "Perestroika as a Revolution," *KOMMUNIST*, No 11, 1990.

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On Two Aspects of Interethnic Relations

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[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Rutkevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] In continuing the line of argument developed in the previous article [1], we would like to take up two very timely aspects of the development of nationality relations in the USSR from the end of the 1950s up to the present. These questions have been repeatedly taken up in the press, including in our journal [2], passions have erupted over them, and numerous subjective and one-sided views have been voiced. We are endeavoring to approach them objectively, relying on a comparative analysis of four postwar population censuses (1959, 1970, 1979, 1989). It is a question of the nationality aspects of migration processes and the opposing trends in the spread of Russian in the USSR.

Nationality Aspects of Migration Processes

An examination of this question cannot be sufficiently complete because the figures from the results of the last (January 1989) population census on migration questions have still not been published (as of November 1990). Nevertheless, on the basis of studying the years-long shifts in the placement of the population over the nation's territory on a nationality breakdown, it is possible to obtain a certain notion of the long-term trends which were established in a comparatively calm period (1959-1988) and how gradually the preconditions matured for those conflict situations and about which one can judge from the data of current statistics and from statements in the periodic press over the last two years.

We are writing about a "comparatively calm" period since the end of the 1950s, as the war was now behind us, as well as the evacuation of the population from the Western areas and reevacuation, the violent resettlement of a number of peoples in "places not so distant" and the return of a majority of them to their historical home areas, the return of the surviving prisoners from the Stalinist camps and so forth. However, organized migration continued into the virgin lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan, into areas of land reclamation and construction projects which were colossal in scale but far from always well-conceived and at times harmful to nature as well as into areas being developed (the oil and gas regions in Western Siberia, the zone of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], the Far East and so forth).

Along with the organized flows of migrations backed up by financial and administrative measures on the part of the government, there have also been flows of spontaneous

migration. Here it is essential first of all to point out the departure of population from the inhabited areas of the Ural and Siberia as well as from a number of oblasts in the center of Russia to the south and west of the nation, where the climatic conditions are better, prices are lower, the warm seas are closer, the social infrastructure is better developed and so forth. This trend has grown noticeably stronger in line with the deterioration of centralized supply for the industrial centers and the increased role of the local market. With little differing coefficients for a natural increase, over the 30 years under examination here, the population of the Urals Region grew by 16 percent, while that of the Northern Caucasus rose by 44 percent (this can only be partially explained by the high increase rate in the national republics of the given region). In many oblasts of the center and northwest of Russia, the population has declined [3], in part due to the influx into Moscow and Leningrad as well as to the south and west of the nation.

A component part of this process has been an increased share of the Russians in the population of the Ukraine and Belorussia. Over the 10 years between the last censuses, the size of the Russian population in the Ukraine rose by 870,000 persons; approximately one-half can be considered due to a natural increase and the other half by the excess of arrivals over departures. As a result, the share of Russians in the republic population in 1989 reached 22 percent (16.9 percent in 1959). In Belorussia, the number of Russians increased over the same period by 200,000 persons while the share in the population in 1989 reached 13.2 percent (8.2 percent in 1959). But due to the involvement of all the nation's peoples in the development of the East as well as to the constant exchange of population, the number of Ukrainians in the RSFSR over the last 10 years has risen by 728,000 and Belorussians by 144,000 [4, 5]. This ongoing "mixing" of peoples close in language and customs has not caused any misunderstanding. Only recently have the national separatists who have come to power in Lvov and a number of other oblasts in the Western Ukraine initiated a campaign against the "dominant influence" of the Russian language and against the "Moskals" (that is, Russians). Thus, the elimination of Russian language lessons in the junior grades of the Ukrainian schools of this area was justified by the fact that the lessons supposedly prevent the children from mastering their mother tongue. However, psychologists and pedagogues have established that the mastery of a second language along with the mother tongue occurs most beneficially precisely at a young age. For example, in France, a special program has been worked out for organizing nurseries where the children will learn simultaneously French and one other European language.

The mass migration from the RSFSR and other republics into the Baltics has entailed more serious consequences for nationality relations. This process went on very actively in the postwar decades, but in the 1980s has begun to slow down somewhat in Latvia and particularly in Lithuania (see Table 1).

Table 1: Changes in National Composition of Population in the Baltic Republics, in % [6-9]

Republic, Nationality	1959	1970	1979	1989
Estonia	100	100	100	100
Including:				
Estonians	74.6	68.2	64.7	61.5
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians	22.3	28.1	32.0	35.2
Other	3.1	3.7	3.3	3.3
Latvia	100	100	100	100
Including:				
Latvians	62.0	56.8	53.7	52.0
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians	30.9	36.1	40.0	41.9
Poles	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.3
Other	4.2	4.4	3.8	3.8
Lithuania	100	100	100	100
Including:				
Lithuanians	79.3	80.1	80.0	79.6
Poles	8.5	7.7	7.3	7.3
Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians	10.3	10.8	11.6	12.3
Other	1.9	1.4	1.1	0.8

Poles in Lithuania and Latvia are considered separately as they have lived here a long time and in Lithuania they are a compact old population in the south of the republic ("Vilnius Region"). The prospect of ending up a minority in their historical territory, having become real for the Latvians and Estonians, has caused serious concern among these peoples. This has been widely utilized by the People's Fronts of Estonia and Latvia. Direct discrimination against minority rights is envisaged by the so-called Citizen Committees which register the former inhabitants of the bourgeois republics and their direct offspring as the future full citizens, thereby preparing to deprive civil rights to the "migrants" since 1940 and their offspring. The struggle against "migrants," "colonizers," "occupiers" and so forth is the main slogan employed for fanning nationalistic separatist attitudes, and for instigating street chauvinism and the multiplying provocations against the Soviet Army officers and soldiers.

It should be pointed out that following Sajudis, the Latvian People's Front has assumed overtly nationalistic positions and at its Third Congress (October 1990) it actually adopted the program of the Citizen Committees. "The 'colonizers' will find it very difficult," commented I. Litvinova in IZVESTIYA, "to obtain citizenship. Their right to land and other property is a major question" [10]. The general pattern has been: arising as a movement "in support of perestroika," the people's fronts in the national republics over the last 2 years of the deepening crisis in the national state organization of the country, have evolved into overtly

separatist parties and movements which have concentrated on withdrawal from the USSR and the rights of the nation above the rights of man. In the Ukraine, Rukh at its last congress (October 1990) also abandoned the phrase "for perestroika" in its program and proclaimed "independence" as its main goal, that is, state separation. This evolution could have been anticipated 2 or 3 years ago, many did predict it but the nation's superior leadership did not spot this evolution for a long time.

But let us return to the Baltic. Since 1989, when the Sajudis bourgeois nationalistic government proclaimed the state independence of Lithuania and the Latvian and Estonian parliaments announced a period of transition to independence, discrimination has hardened against the Russian-speaking population, official attempts were made to deprive a portion of it of civil rights on the basis of introducing settlement census and so forth. For this reason, it is no surprise that an influx has given way to a departure of the Russian population (and generally persons of Russian culture) from the Baltic. The January 1989 Census was still "not able" to reflect this process. But information in periodicals provide a rather clear notion of how abruptly the migration processes have "turned" in the region.

For example, the Latvian State Committee for Statistics has stated that over the last 2 years departures from the republic have exceeded arrivals. Just in the first half of 1990, the negative balance of migration with the RSFSR was 1,129 persons and with the other republics, 2,900; the total was more than 4,000 [10], and this for the scale of Latvia is sizable. While awaiting the question to be settled on the possibilities of finding housing in the places of departure (from housing given up in the republic and this requires the incorporation of special points in the treaties of the Baltic republics with the RSFSR and the other Union republics), the worried persons have sought out various possibilities in leaving spontaneously for relatives, if these exist, accepting jobs in the East and so forth. Others are waiting for the adoption of the USSR Law on the procedures for entering and exiting the nation in order to emigrate to the West. Thus, in Tartu, the Canada Group has appeared and this includes 2,000 Russians and Ukrainians who have expressed a desire to go overseas for permanent residence [11]. Incidentally, the Western countries are hardening their immigration policy for immigrants from Eastern Europe and there is reason to assume that the members of the Canada Group, like many others, will have to change their plans.

Deputies from the Unity Faction in the Latvian Supreme Soviet were forced to turn to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with a request to consider the status of the Russian minority (40 percent of the population) in concluding a treaty between the two republics. In our view, the request should be considered and not only by Latvia but also by all the other republics. The government must protect the interests of the RSFSR citizens outside the limits of the RSFSR.

The new Program of the Latvian People's Front states that the latter supports the creation of a system for preparing Latvian National Cadres for the republic economy while the national minorities (and these include primarily Russians) have the right to obtain only a secondary education in their

mother tongue [10]. While for internal consumption the national separatists standing at the helm of the government in these republics from time to time make placating statements, when "at liberty" they comment much more frankly. Thus, the Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, A. Ryutel, at a session of the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki stated that participation of the Russians in the supreme elective state bodies was to be absolutely excluded and,

furthermore, the prospects of Estonia made no provision for a future for the Russians. Their path lay to the East with minimum compensation [12].

The migration processes have developed somewhat differently in the Transcaucasus Region. Let us trace the years-long trends which existed up to the tragic events of recent years (see Table 2).

Table 2: Population Exchange: Transcaucasus—RSFSR [6-9]

Republic, Nationality	Size of Russian Population in Transcaucasus Republics				Number of Basic Transcaucasus Nationalities in RSFSR			
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959	1970	1979	1989
Georgia	408,000	397,000	372,000	339,000				
Georgians					58,000	69,000	89,000	131,000
Azerbaijan	501,000	510,000	475,000	392,000				
Azeris					71,000	96,000	152,000	337,000
Armenia	56,000	66,000	70,000	51,000				
Armenians					256,000	299,000	365,000	533,000
TOTAL	965,000	973,000	917,000	782,000	385,000	464,000	606,000	1,001,000

In Table 2, the exchange of population between the Transcaucasus republics and the RSFSR is not completely shown. For obtaining a more complete picture, one must also consider the movement of other categories of Russian-speaking population, primarily the Ukrainians and Belorussians. In addition, the departure from the Transcaucasus of persons from the three designated nationalities goes not only to the RSFSR but also into the Ukraine and Belorussia, into Kazakhstan and so forth. But the data given in Table 2 clearly show the long-term trend for a growing departure of the Russian population from the Transcaucasus and simultaneously the broadened departure of the indigenous nationalities of this region for permanent residence in Russia and the Ukraine. Over the last 10 years, beginning in 1979 to the beginning of 1989 (that is, prior to the basic wave of refugees), the Armenian population in these republics increased by 190,000, the Georgian population by 50,000 and the Azerbaijani by 217,000 persons.¹ An important factor encouraging this flow of migration is the overpopulation of a number of regions of the Transcaucasus and this increased sharply after the wave of refugees from Armenia settled in Azerbaijan (and

vice versa), and in Armenia the lack of facilities for the refugees from Azerbaijan was "superimposed" on the disastrous situation of inhabitants from the earthquake zone and the actual blockade of the frontier by Azerbaijan. It must also be considered that a portion of the inhabitants of the Transcaucasus went not only for temporary residence in the North but also permanent residence in order to employ there their skills of private trade and other types of entrepreneurial activity.

These long-term trends gained a substantial acceleration after the exacerbating of the situation in the region. While in the winter of 1988-1989, the wave of forced refugees (over 400,000) ran from Azerbaijan into Armenia and back, in January 1990, around 100,000 persons left Baku, including approximately 75,000 representatives of the Russian-speaking populus (over one-half was servicemen families). Of the 600,000 refugees (according to data for September 1990), 117,000 persons were located in the RSFSR, 17,000 in the Ukraine, 2,000 in Belorussia and 2,700 in Kazakhstan [13].

Analogous figures for the Central Asian Region are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Population Exchange: Central Asia—RSFSR [6-9]

Republic, Nationality	Size of Russian Population in Central Asian Republics				Size of Basic Central Asian Nationalities in RSFSR			
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959*	1970*	1979	1989
Uzbekistan	1,092,000	1,473,000	1,666,000	1,652,000				
Uzbeks					30,000	62,000	72,000	127,000
Turkmenia	263,000	313,000	349,000	334,000				
Turkmen					12,000	20,000	23,000	40,000
Tajikistan	269,000	344,000	395,000	387,000				
Tajiks					—	—	15,000	42,000

Table 3: Population Exchange: Central Asia—RSFSR [6-9] (Continued)

Republic, Nationality	Size of Russian Population in Central Asian Republics				Size of Basic Central Asian Nationalities in RSFSR			
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959*	1970*	1979	1989
Kirghizia	624,000	856,000	912,000	917,000	—	—		
Kirghiz					—	—	18,000	38,000
TOTAL	2,248,000	2,986,000	3,322,000	3,290,000	42,000	82,000	128,000	247,000
					(50,000)	(100,000)		

* The number of Tajiks and Kirghiz in the RSFSR according to the 1959 and 1970 Censuses, is not indicated in the references of the USSR TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] due to the smallness of the figures. In the parentheses, we show the tentative total size for the four nationalities in 1959 and 1970.

From Table 3 it follows that a rapid increase in the Russian population in Central Asia was observed in the 1960s-1970s, while in the 1980s this process initially slowed down somewhat and then the migration balance changed sign from a plus to a minus. In considering that over the 10 years (1979-1989), the size of the Russian population in Central Asia could have increased by 5 percent (150,000) due to the natural increase, the excess of departures over arrivals was approximately 200,000 persons [14, 15]. For the entire Russian-speaking population, these figures must be doubled. After the events in Fergana and Kokand in the summer of 1989, when 63,000 Meskhetian Turks were rapidly evacuated and the instigators of the pogroms threatened persons of other nationalities, the psychological situation for the Russian-speaking population as a whole in Uzbekistan deteriorated sharply. The pogroms in Dushanbe in the autumn of 1989 involved the mass departure of the Russian-speaking population from the city and as a whole from Tajikistan. During the first half of 1990, Tajikistan lost 26,279 persons, including construction workers, pedagogues, physicians, railroad workers, engineers and aviators. Among the reasons for the departure the following were given: the fear of the repetition of the February events and the change in the language situation. The clashes between the Uzbeks and Kirghiz in Osh Oblast² in the summer of 1990 further exacerbated the nationality problems in the region [16, 17]. The public in the republics expressed concern over the mass departure of skilled personnel. With the presence of millions of unemployed in these republics, the enterprises, construction sites and public health institutions are experiencing an acute shortage of specialists. The local authorities are not taking proper measures which could calm the Russian (and as a whole the nonindigenous) population and guarantee its security in the future.

The departure of the Russian-speaking population from these republics has already assumed a mass character. It is being held up predominantly by "technical causes" such as one must find a job and housing outside the region, there is a shortage of containers and so forth. Table 3 shows that the unfavorable processes developed gradually but became apparent at full force during the crisis period.

As for the influx of settlers from Central Asia into the RSFSR, for now this is insignificant although there is a tendency for growth as over the last decade the number of persons from the four basic nationalities of Central Asia in Russia has doubled. This process was basically spontaneous,

although a certain role was played by organized measures to move Uzbek kolkhoz members into Tver, Novgorod and other oblasts in the Nonchernozem Zone which had been abandoned. The basic impediment to departure is the low migrational mobility of the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia, including due to differences in the climate, a poor knowledge of Russian and, primarily, as a consequence of adhering to the way of life established over the centuries.

But clearly, sooner or later, migration of youth from this region will strengthen. The population under working age for the USSR is 27.3 percent, while in Tajikistan it is 43.1 percent, in Turkmenia 42.7 percent, in Uzbekistan 42.9 percent and Kirghizia 39.4 percent [19]. The measures adopted in recent years to increase the size of the private farm and develop local industry, cooperatives and individual labor activity have not been capable of fundamentally altering the situation with surplus labor resources. At present, in Uzbekistan alone around 1 million persons are looking for work and 4 million do not have a permanent job [20]. Simultaneously, at the industrial enterprises there is a growing shortage of skilled workers and specialists for the already mentioned reason: the mass departure of the Russian-speaking population. But the training of skilled personnel from the local youth will require many years of stubborn work.

Over the next few years, overpopulation and, consequently, the share of unemployed among the youth will grow. The size of families in Central Asia, particularly among the rural population, is twice that of the Slavic republics (3.2 persons as an average family size in the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belorussia, while in the rural localities of Tajikistan, it is 7.0, in Uzbekistan 6.2 [19, pp 78-79]). The experience of the countries in the overseas East (India and Pakistan) and the Arab countries (Egypt and the Maghreb countries) shows that a rise in emigration (including temporary, under contract) can remove the tension to a certain degree. In our view, in the treaties to be concluded between the republics and then in the Union Treaty, the legal and political basis should be provided for interrepublic migration of both types (permanent and temporary). This would tell positively on the development prospects of the economy and would eliminate the tension in interethnic relations. For attracting workers to a majority of the economic sectors in the regions to be developed in Siberia and the Far East and thereby accelerate the development of their productive forces, it is essential not only to attract foreign capital to the "free zones," but also provide an influx of manpower on a permanent basis with the corresponding social guarantees.

We intentionally here have not taken up the question of overseas emigration which for a number of peoples (Germans, Jews and partially the Greeks) even now has assumed primary significance and after the adoption of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Exiting will be turned into a complex problem for all society. But this is the subject of a separate article.

On Opposing Trends in the Spread of the Russian Language

Historically, Russia arose as an ethnically unique state and Russian language long before the October Revolution had become a means of interethnic communication. Moreover, it actually performed the role of a state or official language. After the Revolution of 1905-1907, when there began a rapid rise in the national liberation movement in the borderlands, the nationality question became one of the most acute in the nation's political life. In acting from great power positions, the bourgeois-landowner parties demanded that the Russian language be officially granted the status of a state language; here it goes without saying that the other languages would not possess a similar status.

The Bolsheviks headed by Lenin held the most consistent position among the opponents of this idea. In January 1914, Lenin wrote: "...We certainly are in favor that each inhabitant of Russia be able to learn the great Russian language. We do not want only one thing: the element of compulsion.... For no matter how many fine phrases you might say about 'culture,' an obligatory state language involves coercion and hammering in.... Those who in the conditions of their life and work need a knowledge of Russian learn it without the rod. But compulsion (the rod) leads merely to one thing and that is it prevents the access of the great and powerful Russian language into other nationality groups and most importantly exacerbates hostility, it creates a million new frictions, it strengthens irritation, mutual misunderstanding and so forth" [21].

These words at present have a particularly pertinent sound, since after a protracted period of the existence of an actual unitary state as the Soviet Union was during the times of Stalin and his successors, with the start of perestroika a wave of the nationality movement arose. In the Union republics, this was expressed in the declaring of sovereignty and in the legislative reinforcement as a state language of the so-called indigenous nation providing the name for the republic. Simultaneously, a system of measures was adopted legislatively to carry it out and in some places to literally "hammer it" into real life; the multinationality of the republic populations, the presence of minorities, including large ones residing in a compact group on a certain territory (the Poles in Lithuania, the Gagauz in Moldavia and others) were not properly taken into account.

The arguments voiced by Lenin against giving the Russian language the status of a state one are now being read as a direct warning. Not only the Poles in Lithuania and the Gagauz in Moldavia, but also the Uzbek minority in Kirghizia, the Abkhazian and Ossetian in Georgia, the Armenian in Nagornyy Karabakh (that is, in Azerbaijan) and so forth and—this must be particularly emphasized—

ubiquitously the Russian-speaking minority (basically Russian but also involving representatives of almost the entire "nonindigenous" population) express an active protest against the linguistic policy which under the flag of the rights of the indigenous nation flaunts the civil rights of millions of people.

As for the Russian language, it has been proposed that it be declared the state language within the limits of the Union along with the state languages of the republics: "Many comrades...feel it advisable to recognize the status of a common state language for Russian on the scale of the USSR," said M.S. Gorbachev in a report at the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee specially devoted to the problems of interethnic relations [22]. This viewpoint was reflected in Article 17 of the draft of the Treaty of Union: the Russian language is to be considered the state language of the Union [23]. The current status of official language in the foreign relations of the Union and in talks between the republics beyond any doubt does not reflect all the functions actually carried out by Russian as a language of interethnic communication on the entire territory of the nation. A strong argument in defense of the role of Russian in a renewed Union is to be found in the appeal of prominent leaders of Russian culture [24].

Our first article [1] took up the reasons for the extreme exacerbation of interethnic relations and, as a consequence, the relations between the national state formations (the Union, the former autonomous republics, oblasts and okrugs) as well as the growing danger of the break-up of the Union. Here it is essential to provide additions which concern the process of the dissemination of Russian. This process has gone on and is going on in an extremely contradictory manner and the opposite trends are clashing in it. On the one hand, the objective demands for economic and cultural development with the viewpoint of the center for the accelerated development of the borderlands and for the gradual overcoming of the historically inherited differences in the economy and culture have determined the ongoing broadening of the sphere of use of Russian and the acquainting of millions of new people with it. The policy in the sphere of culture and education was aimed at the development of the nationality cultures, education in the mother tongue, the creating of a written language for the peoples previously without it and also creating conditions for the assimilation of Russian particularly by the younger generation. But, on the other hand, under the conditions of growing centralization and the turning of a federative state into a unitary one, the very element of compulsion increased and against which Lenin had acted so decisively. Thus, inevitably resistance increased against the use of Russian.

In actuality, Russian has become predominant in the sphere of office work, it is the official language at a majority of meetings and sessions on the republic and at times the oblast, city and rayon levels throughout the entire nation. Instruction in Russian in the nationality schools even in 1938 was subordinate to the above-declared goal: "Students completing an incomplete secondary school (7 grades) should be able to express their thoughts freely and correctly in Russian, both verbally and in writing" [25]. After the war, when a complete secondary education was declared universal for the youth (10-11 grades), a technical school and then a secondary PTU [vocational-technical school]), this

goal was posed as before but it was not attained. This can be seen from a comparison of data on the growth of the general educational level of the youth in the national republics and on the level of the fluent mastery of Russian. The universal shortage of Russian language teachers in the nationality schools, particularly in the countryside, the low level of their training and the absence of a linguistic environment predetermined the formalism of its instruction. The objectively dictated policy of an accelerated victorious advance of Russia contained (either covertly or openly) that very element of "coercion" which evoked hostility and at times a

feeling of protest by a certain portion of the non-Russian population. The figures given below (see Table 5) on the fluent mastery of Russian, according to the 1979 Census for Estonia and Uzbekistan, eloquently show both the earnestness of the local leadership as well as a resistance on the part of the population.

Let us turn to Table 4 which provides information on the dynamics of the dissemination of Russian in the USSR over the last 30 years.

Table 4: Distribution of Russian Language in USSR [6-8; 26]

Population	1959		1970		1979		1989	
	million	%	million	%	million	%	million	%
Total	208.8	100	241.7	100	262.1	100	285.7	100
Including:								
Russians	114.1	54.6	129.0	53.4	137.2	52.3	145.2	50.8
Persons of non-Russian nationality for whom Russian is mother tongue	10.0	4.8	12.8	5.3	16.3	6.2	18.7	6.5
Persons with free mastery of Russian as second language	23.7	11.4	41.9	17.3	61.3	23.4	68.5	24.0
Total with mastery of Russian	147.8	70.8	183.7	76.0	214.8	81.9	232.4	81.3

The data of Table 4 must be considered as approximate or tentative for two reasons. In the first place, the notion of the "fluent mastery of Russian" at times is given a very diverse content: from the ability to think in this language (without "mentally translating"), and the ability to intelligently set out ideas verbally and in writing to the assimilation of several-score common words. Secondly, a portion of the Ukrainians and Belorussians could be added to the figures in the column "total." V.I. Lenin pointed out that "over seven-tenths of the Russian population belongs to kindred Slavic tribes who in a free school in a free state would easily achieve, due to the demands of economic activity, the possibility of coming to terms without any 'state' privileges for one of the languages" [27]. At present, these peoples make up 69.7 percent of the USSR population [28].

In 1970, one-half, in 1979, one-third and in 1989, one-quarter of the Ukrainians not included in the columns "mother tongue Russian" and "fluent mastery of Russian" were not accounted for in the total line of Table 4. As a consequence of the closeness of the three Eastern Slavic languages, these 20.2 million (1970), 14.0 million (1979)

and 11.0 million (1989) Ukrainians could have been additionally included in the total number of citizens understanding Russian. For the Belorussians these figures provide (using the same estimating method) 2.9 million in 1970, 1.7 million in 1979 and 0.6 million in 1989. Analogous figures for a series of other nationalities "dispersed" over the territory of the nation (Jewish, German and Polish with the exception of a number of regions bordering on Poland—Bulgarian, Korean, a portion of the Armenian permanently residing outside the Transcaucasus and so forth) make it possible to increase the total figure for persons mastering Russian up to approximately 0.3 million persons in 1970 and 0.5 million in 1989.

On the other hand, in the course of the questioning during the census, mass distortions were made at times, as has been mentioned above. Thus, during the 1979 Census, in Estonia a portion of Estonians who previously indicated that they had a fluent mastery of Russian were recorded as "no mastery" and as a result (see Table 5), the number of this category was reduced by almost 5 percent in comparison with 1979. The results of the 1989 Census for Estonia show that there had been no decline.

Table 5: Fluent Mastery of Russian as Mother or Second Language Among Persons of Indigenous Nationalities Residing in Different Regions of Nation (1979-1989), % [7-8; 26]

Nationality	1970			1979			1989		
	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total Mother Tongue Russian	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total Mother Tongue Russian	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total
a) Volga-Cisural Region of RSFSR*									
Tatars	9.3	62.2	71.5	11.7	68.7	80.4	14.4	72.7	87.1
Chuvash	12.0	58.6	70.6	17.0	65.4	82.4	22.5	65.9	88.4
Mordvins	20.2	67.0	87.2	25.3	67.3	92.6	31.0	64.3	95.3
Bashkirs	3.8	52.9	56.7	6.1	64.8	70.9	8.5***	72.6	81.1
Udmurts	16.4	63.7	80.1	22.3	65.2	87.5	29.2	62.3	91.5
Mari	7.9	62.7	70.6	12.0	70.3	82.3	18.1	69.5	87.6
Komi**	15.5	65.2	80.7	22.8	65.0	87.8	29.0	62.5	91.5
As average for total number of family of nationalities for region	11.0	61.4	72.4	16.7	66.1	82.8	18.2	69.6	87.8
b) Transcaucasus Region									
Georgians	0.5	20.1	20.6	0.5	25.5	26.0	0.3	31.8	32.1
Azeris*	0.8	14.6	15.4	1.0	27.2	28.2	0.7	31.5	32.2
Armenians	3.8	26.8	30.6	4.5	36.3	40.8	3.0	45.3	48.3
As average for three nationalities to their number in region	1.6	19.9	21.5	1.9	29.4	31.3	1.3	35.5	36.8
c) Baltic Region									
Lithuanians	0.3	34.9	35.2	0.3	52.8	53.1	0.4	37.4	37.8
Latvians	1.9	45.3	47.2	2.2	58.2	60.4	2.7	65.6	68.3
Estonians	0.8	27.6	28.4	1.1	23.1	24.2	1.2	33.6	34.8
Average for three nationalities to their number in region	0.8	36.4	37.2	0.9	47.8	48.7	1.2	44.1	45.3
d) Central Asian Region									
Uzbeks	0.4	13.5	13.9	0.5	49.1*	43.6	0.4	22.9	23.3
Tajiks	0.5	14.8	15.3	0.6	29.2	29.8	0.6	27.1	27.7
Kirghiz	0.2	18.4	18.6	0.4	28.7	29.1	0.4	29.4	29.8
Turkmen	1.8	27.3	29.1	0.8	24.7	25.5	1.1	26.9	28.0

* For the given aggregate of nationalities as the region the entire territory of the RSFSR has been taken. ** Including the Komi-Permyaks. *** The figure has been obtained by extrapolation, as it is necessary to subtract the number of persons for whom Russian is the mother tongue.

The USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee] has pointed out that for Armenia and Azerbaijan the population count was not accurate in 1989.

Table 5: Fluent Mastery of Russian as Mother or Second Language Among Persons of Indigenous Nationalities Residing in Different Regions of Nation (1979-1989), % [7-8; 26] (Continued)

Nationality	1970			1979			1989		
	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total Mother Tongue Russian	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total Mother Tongue Russian	Mother Tongue Russian	Fluent Mastery of Russian	Total
Average for four nationalities to their number in region	0.5	14.9	15.4	0.5	38.0*	38.5	0.5	24.6	25.1

* The figure is clearly overstated and this led to the distorting of the data for 1979 and for the region.

Another sort of example. The local leadership in Uzbekistan, in desiring to win the favor of the center, in 1979 encouraged the statistical bodies and census-takers to increase the percentage of persons who had a fluent mastery of Russian. The "jump" from 13.9 percent in 1970 to 49.1 percent in 1979 was the fruit of outright falsification as became obvious after carrying out the 1989 Census, when this percentage dropped sharply to 22.9 percent. We give the figures for all the Uzbeks residing in the Central Asian Region. If one takes the figures just for Uzbekistan, then they are even more striking as the number of Uzbeks "with a fluent mastery of Russian" had "risen" over the 9 years from 1,010,000 to 5,591,000 (from 13 percent to 53 percent)! This was a clear "forgery." If one employs the interpolation method, the share of these persons in actuality in 1979 would be approximately 17 percent.

This is why we consider it valid to reduce the figure in the line "total" for 1979 to 210.8 million and this will reduce the total percentage of persons knowing Russian to one or another degree to 80.4 percent and will make it possible to show the overall growth curve over the 30 years more accurately as an increase which is gradually slowing down. In other words, in our view, we must not view 1979 as an unique "peak" in the spread of Russian through the nation.

Thus, it can be asserted with a sufficient degree of reliability that currently six out of seven citizens in the Soviet Union know Russian on a level sufficient for purposes of communication. One out of seven does not know Russian and among the youth there are more and this, in particular, not only reduces their potential mobility but is also a serious obstacle when the young men from a number of nationalities serve in the Soviet Army.

The overall data for the nation, however, are insufficient as the situation involving the knowledge of Russian differs strongly for the regions and the republics. In Table 5 the process of the dissemination of Russian is examined for four regions. Although the data given in this table speak for themselves, nevertheless, they require certain clarifications.

The peoples of Uigur-Finnish and Turkic origin residing in the Volga and in the Cisurals have their own national state formations but have spread far outside them, both in the given region as well as for Russia and the nation as a whole. For this reason, in the calculations we have taken the

number (and also the knowledge of Russian) of persons in each of these nationalities for the RSFSR and not just for "their own" republic. These peoples who have lived over the centuries side-by-side with the Russians and with one another at present to a significant degree have been mixed in and partially assimilated. Thus, the number of Mordvins has declined (with the ordinary, mean indicators for a natural increase) from 1,285,000 in 1959 to 1,154,000 in 1989 [6, p 300; 27, p 42]. However, characteristic of all these peoples is a rise in the proportional amount of persons maintaining their nationality but considering Russian their mother tongue; for example, this percentage among the Udmurts has risen from 10.2 in 1959 to 29.2 in 1989. As a whole for the seven peoples, the proportional amount of persons mastering Russian (including those considering it their mother tongue) has been systematically increasing, approaching 90 percent. We feel that the currently occurring strong rise in national self-awareness, the "parade of sovereignties" which has engulfed these republics and the proclaiming of the language of the indigenous population in the republics as the state one along with Russian will not serve as an obstacle for a natural increase in bilingualism.

The process of the dissemination of Russian has occurred completely differently in the borderlands of the nation, particularly in regions with the compact inhabiting by nations which possess their own state and were incorporated in different ways as part of the Russian Empire. We would point out that here as well we have viewed each nation not only in "its own" republic but within the limits of the given region, since a significant number of Uzbeks resides in the other republics of Central Asia, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Armenians in Georgia (and until recently in Azerbaijan) and so forth.

In the Transcaucasus, among the Armenians, Georgians and Azeris, Russian is named as a mother tongue by a very insignificant group of persons, basically as a consequence of mixed marriages. As for the number of persons who have a fluent mastery of Russian, this has been gradually rising among all three nations and is around one-third of those questioned of the Georgians and Azeris residing in the region and around one-half for the Armenians. The sharp exacerbation of ethnic relations, including the increased anti-Russian feelings artificially fanned by the national separatist parties and movements (particularly after the drama in Tbilisi in April 1989, the introduction of troops into Baku in January 1990, the armed clashes of units of the

Soviet Army and the internal troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] with the Armenian militants on the boundaries of the NKAO [Nagornyy-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and so forth) and the departure of a portion of the Russian-speaking population—all of this, undoubtedly, had a negative effect and will be felt in the future even more strongly on the role of the Russian language as a means of communication between the inhabitants of the Transcaucasus as well as with other peoples of the nation. The linguistic policy of the nationalistic forces which have come to power in Armenia and Georgia is aimed at a linguistic discrimination against the Russian-speaking population and at curtailing the sphere of use of Russian.

In the 1920s, V. V. Mayakovskiy pointed out that with the rise in the next wave of nationalism, "the Kazan Academy will correspond in French with the Tiflis one" [29]. As for the Kazan affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences, it as yet has not shown any such desire but it is possible at the Georgian Academy of Sciences.

In the Baltic the degree of the mastery of Russian as a whole is higher than in the Transcaucasus. And here the artificial understating of data on the fluent mastery of Russian in Lithuania and Estonia in 1979 distorted the picture. We assume that during the 1970s and 1980s there has gradually been (among the Latvians more rapidly than among the Estonians and Lithuanians) a process of the mastery of Russian. Taking into account the significant share of Russian-speaking population, particularly in the towns, the heavy influx of tourists and resort visitors and the comparatively high cultural level of the Baltic peoples, the slowness of this process, in our view, to a significant degree can be explained by political factors, that is, by the spread of nationalistic attitudes which made themselves felt with particular force at the end of the 1980s. The policy of the separatist governments which came to power was aimed at curtailing the teaching of Russian in school, and the complete elimination of it as the official language within the republics, including in the economic management bodies, in office work, trade, the service sphere and so forth. The proclaiming of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian languages as the state ones and the implementing of the related laws which prescribe their learning in a short period of time in a compulsory manner under the threat of the loss of a job contain not an "element" of compulsion but are clearly compulsion in terms of the Russian-speaking population.

In the Central Asian Region, the process of the spread of the sphere of bilingualism also has occurred slowly, and in the 1980s it has slowed down and in some places been reversed. The data on the Uzbek population, as we have already seen, are not sufficiently reliable while the decline in the percentage of persons who have a fluent mastery of Russian by 2.1 percent among the Tajiks, with an increase of 2.5 percent among the Turkmen and 1.1 percent among the Kirghiz shows serious difficulties in the dissemination of Russian. In this region as a reason in first place has been the rapid rise in the number of the indigenous population, particularly rural and continuing to lead a traditional way of life and the increased share of youth in its composition. The level of instruction in the school remains low and for Russian in

particular. Those who complete the rural school in the remote villages write in their mother tongue with major errors. A comparatively small portion of the youth from the indigenous nationalities is hired in the labor collectives with a mixed ethnic composition (large enterprises) where Russian is essential for the purposes of communication.

In Central Asia, the proclaiming of the language of the indigenous nationality as the state one with all the ensuing consequences clearly has led to a narrowing of the sphere of use of Russian and a growing departure of the Russian (and Russian-speaking) population which was mentioned above and will further reduce the possibilities of the use of Russian in everyday communication.

As for the dissemination of Russian in our nation over the immediate future, a great deal will be determined by the development of political events over the next 2 or 3 years. With what composition will the renewed Union emerge from the current very severe socioeconomic and national crisis? What will be the form of the new Union of sovereign republics, and what will be the content of the Treaty of Union? What will be the functions of central power—of the president, the government and the parliament? What will the federative treaty be like in Russia? To a very great degree the solution to each of these questions will determine the migrational flows, the sphere of the use of Russian and other languages, the policy in the area of culture and education in each of the republics comprising the Union. It would be a difficult matter to predict the course of events in this situation. We will be so bold, nevertheless, to voice two proposals.

In the first place, the Russian language in any event should gain the status of the state language in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Secondly, it must be given the status of the state language of the Union (with the establishing of this in the Treaty of Union), whatever forms the Union may adopt in the future. This is essential not only for reinforcing its role as the official language in relation to the other states and the principals of federation (or confederation) but also in the broader sense. In one way or another, the functions of the center should include defense, transportation and communications, power, the nuclear industry and much else. Since political and technical documentation require standardization, it must be drawn up in one, completely definite language comprehensible to all. In the historically formed conditions, only Russian can be this language.

As for the long run, it can be correctly assessed in a general configuration only considering the interaction of the objective trends of differentiation and integration in the development of the nations and both on a regional and world scale. The second trend—and this was pointed out by Lenin at the beginning of our century—is predominant. But the predominance of the integration trend at the end of the 20th Century has assumed qualitatively a different content. During the years of World War I, Lenin assumed that an United States of Europe was either impossible or would be reactionary [30]. At present, at least in Western and Central Europe, development is moving precisely in this direction. The European Community (and it has become not only economic but also political) exists and is expanding, and its

role cannot be assessed uniformly, as association contributes to progress in the economy and to improved prosperity for the peoples of Europe. But this does not remove the reactionary aspects, for example, the joint financial exploitation of the former colonies. However, forms of integration can also vary (for example, in North and Latin America, in the countries of the Maghreb and East Asia). It is impossible to escape the fact that in our country on one-sixth of the land mass, on the expanses of Eastern Europe and Central Asia historically a community has formed of hundreds of peoples, large and small, and precisely after the October Revolution these peoples made substantial headway along the path of integration in economic and cultural life. Previously called Russia and now the USSR, the region is unique and quite naturally within its limits the forms of integration have had and will have substantial particular features.

In our view, in spite of the temporarily prevailing trend toward differentiation which has already in some places devolved into the disintegration of the Union, the integration trend in the economic and cultural life of the peoples will sooner or later "have its say." The forthcoming transition to market relations will objectively contribute to this. At times, one hears that "first we must disunite and then we will unite." This formula proposed as a slogan by separatists of various sorts, with its external dialecticalness (and similarity to the slogan advanced at one time by Lenin for resolving internal party differences, that is, in a completely different sense), in practice can lead along a path involving colossal losses, a tragedy for millions of people who are turned from rightful citizens into migrants, refugees or second-class persons. The renewal of the Union is possible and necessary without the intentional creation of excess obstacles, including obstacles in the use of Russian both by persons for whom it is the mother tongue as well as by those who have mastered it with benefit for themselves and, finally, by those who in the future will master it along with their mother tongue. We are convinced that the role of Russian in interethnic contacts—regardless of the inevitable zigzags of the historical process—will grow both in the renewed Union and in the world.

Footnotes

1. Estimates of the author.
2. Over 2,000 Russians left Osh Oblast [18].

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Youth Under Conditions of a Transition to Market Relations

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[Article by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Mironov, candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate at the Scientific Research Center under the Youth Institute of the Komsomol Central Committee and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. Our journal has published his article "From Wage to Wage" (No 1, 1990)]

[Text] Recently the situation in our economy has taken a turn, unfortunately, for the worse. For a majority of the workers, perestroika has ended up with a reduction in their standard of living and has become a factor of tension and uncertainty of tomorrow. While just several years ago the very word "unemployment" was perceived as something impossible in our country, at present it is already a reality. The chronic absence of the most essential things, the daily expectation of new shortages and the increased prices not only on the market but also in state trade—all of this is the consequences of the catastrophically dropping standard of living of the population, including the youth.

Unfortunately, the prospects are not completely clear. The "Basic Directions..." for the transition to a market can be positively perceived by the workers if from the very outset they will permit an improvement in the daily life of the public and in the future will ensure a defense of their interests against the dangers and distortions of a market economy.

Under these contradictory conditions, the Scientific Research Center under the Youth Institute of the Komsomol Central Committee and the USSR Goskointrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] in 1990 conducted a study on the question "Youth and the Economy." The poll encompassed workers employed in various spheres of labor activity (see Table 1). The questionnaires were filled out by 2,100 persons, of which 80 percent was young persons under the age of 30.

Table 1: Distribution of Persons Questioned by Spheres of Labor, %

Labor Sphere	Age, Years	
	Under 30	Over 30
State enterprise, institution, organization	63.4	52.5
Lease, leased enterprise	5.4	6.7
Collective contract	2.5	2.2
Cooperative	11.0	19.4
Individual labor activity	6.0	8.5
Family contract	0.7	0.4
Sovkhoz, agroindustrial association	3.7	2.6
Kolkhoz	1.6	1.6
Peasant farm	0.4	0.2

Table 1: Distribution of Persons Questioned by Spheres of Labor, % (Continued)

Labor Sphere	Age, Years	
	Under 30	Over 30
Other occupations	5.3	5.9

The young workers of the 1990s are a generation on whose shoulders will rest the burden of perestroika. It is precisely this generation which will have to change professions repeatedly, constantly improve its skills and follow a path of cooperative and individual labor activity [ILA]. Our hopes for a renewal of society are largely tied to the youth. For this reason, it is so important to know the opinion of the youth concerning the occurring changes. In order to more thoroughly understand the attitude of youth toward perestroika, it is essential to determine the motives of activity which it is forming and the value guidelines. Let us use the results of our research.

The youth is endeavoring to voice its ideas on the existing situation. Some 8.9 percent of the respondents pointed out that the changes presently occurring in the nation's economy do not "line up" with their understanding of the construction of socialism, and 13.4 percent of the participants in the poll under the age of 30 and 19.1 percent over the age of 30 feel that socialism, as a system, has outlived itself and that the future belongs to modernized capitalism. A portion of those questioned (15.5 percent of those under the age of 30 and 18 percent over the age of 30) adheres to the tradition of a "strong hand" and feels that order in society in the course of perestroika should be maintained by any means, even with the aid of force. The largest groups of those replying (46.8 percent and 44.6 percent, respectively, for the age categories) are not the followers of various "isms." For them it is important that the nation have a high standard of living for the public. One might assume that those questioned are first concerned for their own well-being but here it is a question of the entire population and only 4.3 percent and 2.8 percent of the respondents—corresponding to the age categories—are concerned for their own well-being.

In our opinion, speaking about the attitude toward perestroika and the transition of the economy to market relations, we must not particularly ideologize the notion of a market. A market cannot be a political category (a socialist market, capitalist and so forth). This is primarily an economic category with all the ensuing consequences. The realization of interests, self-expression and the self-affirmation of a man of labor occur directly in the production sphere. But the process of self-affirmation for workers as the main principals of production relations goes on slowly and is far from uniform. The mechanism for involving the principals in the process of a market economy has still not been worked out. The realization in fact of the idea of self-management and cost accounting and a real and not a formal overcoming of the alienation of labor is a realization of the potential opportunities and advantages of the new economic policy.

In our research, we have studied individual labor collectives. For an analysis two major sectors were chosen: industry and agriculture. Less than one-half of those polled participated in

the affairs of the labor collective and the differences were insignificant for the sectors. Thus, in the working out and forming of production plans, one out of every nine of those polled was involved while among the agricultural workers, the figure was 17.4 percent. One out of 5 in industry is concerned with the saving of resources and in agriculture the figure is 28.6. This shows a disinterested attitude on the part of the youth toward the affairs of the collective. The problem is that with the transition of the enterprises to cost accounting, the youth are the basic claimants for dismissal. The picture is quite different among those employed in other types of management. For example, among the employees of cooperatives, 51.3 percent take an active part in improving product quality. This again shows that a lease, a cooperative and other nonstate forms of property impel the production participants to more highly productive labor and involvement in the affairs of the collective.

Let us establish certain criteria for a person's attitude toward labor.

- The view of labor as the basic means of existence;
- An assessment of the social necessity and utility of one's labor;
- The desire to realize in the process and result of labor one's abilities, knowledge, habits and skills.

How are these criteria manifested in real life?

To the question in the questionnaire "If you were given the possibility of a choice, what form of management would you personally prefer?", we received the following answers (see Table 2).

Table 2: Dependence of Choice of Place of Employment Upon Form of Economic Activity*, %

Form of Economic Activity	Age, Years	
	Under 30	Over 30
State enterprise	9.5	15.2
Cooperative	17.5	18.2
Leased enterprise	10.1	9.3
Family lease	8.7	20.5
Individual labor activity	10.8	11.3
Joint enterprise	34.2	28.5
People's enterprise (belonging to labor collective)	10.3	6.7
Municipal enterprise (belonging to local self-administrative bodies)	2.4	2.6
Did not reply	14.3	11.3

* In the table the total exceeds 100 percent due to the fact that the participants in the poll could choose several variations of an answer.

Preference was given to joint enterprises (34.2 percent of those questioned under the age of 30 and 28.5 percent over the age of 30 indicated this). Then the opinions differed:

while the youth chose for themselves cooperatives, ILA, people's and leased enterprises, older persons expressed a desire to work on a family lease, in a cooperative, in a state enterprise or engage in ILA.

As we see, labor at a state enterprise was in 6th place among the youth while among older persons it was in fourth place. The nonstate enterprises provide an opportunity for a person to show maximum economic independence, to be the master of his job (35.1 percent and 39.8 percent of those questioned pointed to this, respectively), to earn more (27.8 percent and 21.6 percent) and test themselves in a new undertaking (14.7 percent and 14.7 percent).

Attention should also be paid to the involvement of the respondents in various forms of youth economic activity. A preference remains for the Komsomol enterprises regardless of the fact that they still do not fully satisfy the youth. Some 31.6 percent of those questioned pointed to this. And the basic reason for dissatisfaction is that the economic mechanism does not work (20.7 percent). And in actuality, the youth enterprises have only just begun to be established and the new taxation law has made them the equal of operating state enterprises.

In order to understand the attitude of the modern youth to labor, it is essential to view labor activity in the broad social context and in relationship to other aspects of activity. The interests of the basic mass of the working youth rest in the family and domestic sphere, and are oriented sooner at consumption than at an active, creative establishment and development of personality. Moreover, the existing stereotype of ordinary consciousness which links the social status of the individual with the level of its prosperity and material abilities predetermines the desire to have perhaps not a very interesting job but a well-paid one. For youth, the positive changes in labor, everyday life and material status become possibly only in the event when the new economic mechanism is working at full force. For now for 46.4 percent of those questioned life is going on satisfactorily, for 24 percent it is unsatisfactory; the remainder could not reply.

What is concealed behind these figures? If we assess the material situation, then over the last 2 or 3 years for one out of every three respondents this has not changed. Some 33.1 percent feel that it has rather improved. However, almost one out of four noticed a deterioration in his material situation. What are the prospects here? Some 28.2 percent of those questioned did not count on an improvement, and in the opinion of 12.7 percent the situation will deteriorate and only 23.1 percent asserted that it would be better. We were interested in what specific ways were seen by the younger people for achieving material prosperity (see Table 3).

Table 3: Opinion of Youth About Ways for Improving Their Material Situation, %

Replies	Age, Years	
	Under 30	Over 30
Transfer to highly paid job	17.5	13.9

Table 3: Opinion of Youth About Ways for Improving Their Material Situation, % (Continued)

Replies	Age, Years	
	Under 30	Over 30
Participate in additional job	16.7	12.1
Engage in individual labor activity	6.6	6.1
Obtain material aid, loans at place of employment	2.0	2.0
Join cooperative	8.9	8.3
Leave temporarily for employment abroad	6.5	4.8
Leave for permanent residence abroad	3.0	2.0
Wait for increase in wages on the job	15.1	20.0
Obtain access to scarce goods	4.6	1.8
I do not see any ways to improve my material situation	13.2	13.1
Hard to answer	5.9	15.9

While the youth prefer a transfer to highly paid work (17.5 percent), participation in additional earning (16.7 percent) and the expectation of increased wages on the job (15.1 percent), the older persons intend to wait for a rise in wages (20.0 percent), a transfer to a highly paid job (13.9 percent) or participating in extra work (12.1 percent). There is virtually the same share of persons desiring to join a cooperative: respectively, 8.9 percent and 8.3 percent. Some 9.5 percent of the young persons is ready for a temporary or permanent departure abroad to work. The given indicator can increase under the conditions of the free departure of citizens. But this is in the future and at present 13.2 percent of the young persons does not see any way for improving his material situation. To this we must add the 20.7 percent of those who could not reply.

All those questioned agreed on one thing: each person must be paid as much as he can earn (some 81.7 percent of the respondents under the age of 30 pointed to this and 81.8 percent of those over 30).

The basic and, in our opinion, only source of prosperity for the youth is wages. Let us trace how the wages and income of a family member have changed over the last 2 years (Tables 4, 5).

Table 4: Distribution of Average Monthly Wages of Young Workers Employed in Various Sectors, %

Total	1988	1990	
	In Industry	In Industry	In Agriculture
Under 100 rubles	4.8	6.5	9.4
101-150 rubles	19.2	25.2	26.7

Table 4: Distribution of Average Monthly Wages of Young Workers Employed in Various Sectors, % (Continued)

Total	1988	1990	
	In Industry	In Industry	In Agriculture
151-200 rubles	22.7	24.5	29.9
201-250 rubles	25.1	17.0	13.8
Over 250 rubles	28.2	26.8	20.2

Table 5: Dis/tribution of Per Capita Income of Young Workers Employed in Various Sectors, %

Total	1988	1990	
	In Industry	In Industry	In Agriculture
Under 50 rubles	5.5	7.6	16.5
51-70 rubles	13.0	15.5	30.9
71-100 rubles	41.1	19.7	14.1
101-150 rubles	19.2	28.4	19.3
151-200 rubles	16.3	18.5	12.8
Over 200 rubles	4.9	10.3	6.4

As can be seen from Table 4, there has been an increase in the number of young workers employed in industry and agriculture and receiving a wage under 100 rubles (one of the reasons is the general rise in the minimum wage). Moreover, there has been an increased number of persons questioned who received wages within 101-150 rubles and 151-200 rubles (almost one-quarter in industry and one-third in agriculture). At the same time, there has been a decline in the number of workers receiving over 200 rubles. Here cost accounting has made itself felt and unearned money is no longer paid. The Law on Enterprises in the USSR does not restrict the maximum wage level and this is regulated by the law on citizen taxation. Here the action of the first law is cancelled out by the second, since the tax rates after a certain amount are so high that they do not encourage a rise in wages (this paradox is manifested in a transition to market relations). All the same, the average wage of the youth in 1990 increased somewhat. While in 1989 this was 120-140 rubles [1], in 1990 it was 130-152 rubles (according to the data of the Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee], over the 9 months of 1990 the increase in wages was about 9 percent [2]). But, if we see how the persons questioned were distributed in terms of per capita income (Table 5), the picture is depressing: 71.2 percent had an income under 150 rubles, with 7.6 percent of them under 50 rubles and 15.5 percent from 51 to 70 rubles. In practical terms, these people lived beyond the poverty line. And only 19.7 percent had a per capita income within limits of 71-100 rubles. From this it can be concluded that the real wages of a significant portion of the youth has not provided an opportunity to satisfy needs on a level of the existing social consumption rate. The USSR Goskomtrud has worked out a "consumer basket" and this determines the minimum acceptable level of satisfying needs [3, pp 209-218]. However, the

"basket" will be empty as the required goods are not found in state trade (on 1 August 1990, of the 1,094 types of goods produced in our nation, around 20 were in uninterrupted sale [4]). The press has given the prices for goods in state trade, second-hand stores, cooperatives and on the black market [5]. The figures speak for themselves. In order to simply clothe oneself, it takes 7,000 rubles (here we are not viewing prices for food products but they are constantly growing). And what can a young person allow himself to purchase with a wage of 130-150 rubles, considering that much is lacking in state trade? Prices in the transition to market relations rise and then the situation of the youth will become simply catastrophic.

In the existing situation the problem of social guarantees becomes very urgent. To what degree are the interests of the youth protected in real life? In our research, only 2.9 percent provided an affirmative answer to this question, 47.2 percent feel that the interests of the youth are not defended at all, while 28.8 percent feel that their interests are not sufficiently defended. Thus, 76 percent of the questioned young persons feel social infringement. This causes anxiety. On whom can they rely? The answer most often encountered in the questionnaire (28.1 percent) is that the youth are not protected by any organizations. Some 1.4 percent of those questioned considered the party organizations as their protectors, 1.9 percent the enterprise management, 2.8 percent the trade unions, 4.6 percent the self-management bodies (STK [labor collective council]), 5.0 percent the soviets of people's deputies and 23.9 percent the Komsomol organizations. At the same time, statements that the Komsomol has been granted extensive rights and opportunities in settling many questions concerning the situation of youth under present-day conditions are perceived as mere declarative and 41.5 percent of those questioned felt that the Komsomol has only formal rights.

In the new situation a special role will be played by not the political formations but rather the economic management methods. The defense of the interests of the youth should be carried out not by individual social organizations but by state structures. Only through a system of state social guarantees which includes the legislatively reinforced forms and levels of support for the various groups of the population is it possible to achieve equal chances for all. This should be backed up by legislative enactments in the area of unemployment, the regulating of wages, a social security system, the distribution of gratis services from the public consumption funds and a financial policy for all the population, including the youth. Under these conditions a greater role will be played by the committees (or departments under the executive committees) on youth affairs. All the youth movements (including the Komsomol) should join forces around them. And only the committees (departments) will be able to act as the expressers and defenders of the interests and social guarantees for all the strata of the youth on the basis of legislation. With good reason, 41.6 percent of those questioned linked their hopes to the passage of a Youth Law which would provide guarantees (primarily economic) in the difficult period of restructuring and in the future.

The converting to a market will pose a whole series of problems: 1. Privatization of property and the youth, 2. unemployment, 3. protecting the interests and social guarantees for the youth.

The converting to market relations envisages, in particular, denationalization of the economy and privatization.

While denationalization is understood as taking from the state the functions of direct economic management, the turning over of the appropriate powers to the enterprise level, and replacing vertical ties with horizontal ones which can also occur without a change of owner, privatization understands a replacing of the owner by turning over or selling under various conditions the state property of economic principals which in the future will use it in economic activities, bearing full material liability for its results. The most complex mechanism of carrying out privatization exists for the youth. For example, in purchasing enterprises by their collectives the youth cannot be a competitor of the regular workers. The most acceptable version is the issuing of stocks or other securities for the share of fixed capital. Our calculations indicate that if such an operation were carried out in the nation, then each able-bodied person would have a total of over 18,000 rubles of fixed capital, and if only for those employed in the national economy, then this would be over 21,000 rubles. This would equalize the starting position of each. Then the young worker on equal footing with everyone else would participate in establishing the joint, small, leasehold and cooperative enterprises and be engaged in private entrepreneurship.

As early as 1988, the results of our research showed that with the transition of the enterprises to cost accounting the young workers were the prime candidates for dismissal. Market relations will exacerbate this situation, as the enterprises operating at a loss will be closed down and broken up. Unemployed will appear. Even now, there are 6 million of them in the nation and by 1992, their numbers will rise to 11.6 million [3, p 111]. Problems will arise in job placement and retraining. Each region will need a labor exchange which will establish the supply of jobs, the demand for the labor force and provide services in job placement. But this, in our opinion, is not enough. There must also be a vocational guidance center. Its task will be to carry out policy in the area of the vocational guidance of the public, as well as conducting sociological research in the aim of studying professional interests and preferences. Workers could be trained under the new conditions by converted vocational-technical schools and these can be joint-stock, cooperative and even private.

As is known, the youth provides society with more than it receives on the economic level. At present, such a situation must be fundamentally changed and for this reason the core of policy should be defending the interests and social guarantees of the youth. We have already pointed out that this is a function of the state structures. The new formations, in particular, the committees for youth affairs, will serve as the connecting link.

The interests of the youth can be defended on the basis of realizing special programs which include questions of

employment, housing construction, the production of goods and services and so forth. The program should make provision for raising the minimum wage up to the level of the subsistence minimum, as well as paying unemployment assistance. To encourage the enterprise to hire young workers they should be freed from paying a fee for labor resources to the budget.

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Characters in a Play Entitled "Perestroyka"

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[Text] Perestroyka in the nation is in its ideal a revolutionary process in the course of which all spheres of society and the entire system of social relations should be radically transformed. However, even if this were the case, it would be naive to assume that the attitude toward such changes would be uniform among all the social groups making up society. It is quite natural that such changes do not occur painlessly and rather are accompanied by an acute struggle of contradictory interests. As a result, there is the polarizing of social attitudes toward perestroyka expressed in a differentiation of the goals of actual activity of people and this activity can be both of an open and a latent character

These goals depend primarily upon the place of the individuals in the system of existing social relations and the latter are determined by the established management mechanism and by the political structure of society

The old administrative-command system the basic function of which was the dictating of terms to the producer and the

consumer has partially collapsed. But the new economic mechanism which would be based on a market has not been created.

Many enterprise leaders simply do not know what to do with the obtained independence, for up to now the entire system of economic management has been oriented at the center and all economic ties have run through it.

The interorganizational chaos in the national economy naturally is reflected in the vital activities of individual persons and entire social groups. Here it must be considered that with the increased educational level of the workers even in the 1970s there was a clearly marked tendency for an increased role of self-regulation in the behavior of people and, conversely, reduced opportunities for the external control or, to put it more accurately, manipulation. The orders of a superior most often were carried out only when these coincided with the desires of the subordinate. At present, this situation prevails. Do you remember that ideas become a material force only when they are taken up by the masses? M.S. Gorbachev has understood this, in calling on his numerous trips throughout the nation for the workers (the people) to take the cause of perestroyka in their own hands, not to wait for the adoption of laws but rather be guided by the common ideas set out in the party documents.

But the people is an extremely complex phenomenon: minors and the party officials, the state and economic bureaucracy and the remnants of the peasantry, the workers of industrial giants and auxiliary workers in food stores. There exists a large number of social groups (SG) which are elements of the system which is called "the people." They have different values, interests, standards of conduct, goals, and each of these social groups has taken a differing attitude toward the idea of perestroyka, deriving from it the main thing for themselves.

The complexity of the situation is exacerbated by the fact that within itself a formal SG is often heterogeneous. Its internal elements in their values and standards of conduct at times differ from one another more than from other groups.

By these differences we ultimately are inclined to explain all disruptions in the normal functioning of the economy, including a decline in production, a disruption of economic ties, the development of numerous scarcities and even enormous losses of the very rich 1990 harvest on the nation's fields. What is concealed behind the differentiation of the social groups and what is its prime cause?

The contradictory perestroyka processes brought to life a diverse range of activities and these manifested various levels of social maturity of individuals and groups. There is no doubt that social maturity is manifested in activity. For this reason, the question of increasing this is simultaneously a question of raising the efficiency of activity. At present, this is an extremely important scientific and practical task, for an understanding of the patterns of the process opens up an opportunity for its conscious regulation.

The task of renewing a socialist society and the restructuring of all spheres of its life require the highest social activeness

on the part of each Soviet person. However, the mismatching of interests in the various social groups and individuals in real life has led to their posing of goals which do not coincide and often contradict one another and, correspondingly, to inadequate behavior. Thus, a contradiction is born between the required and the real activity of the individual members of society and their groups and this is defined as the level of their social maturity. The concept of "social maturity" (SM), regardless of whether this is being applied to an individual, a certain social group, class or labor collective, describes the nature of the involvement of the principal in real social ties and relations as expressed in the diverse manifestations of activity contributing to or opposing the progressive all-round development of the individual, the collective or society as a whole.

In the given definition, the term "involvement" is the central carcass element which bears the important semantic load. We, in one way or another, like it or not, are involved in a system of social relations. We differ one from another in this sense precisely in the nature of involvement which in the most general form reflects the relationship of our actions with the development of society: Are we assisting it, are we opposing or do we hold a neutral position? The designated correlation can be correctly interpreted clearly only in the instance that one proceeds from an assessment of the satisfaction of the individual (group and so forth) with the existing system of social relations. In this article, in the future we will speak only about the social maturity of the individual and the problem of the formation of this was studied by us at a number of industrial enterprises in the electrical engineering sector. The research was conducted in 1989-1990 by forces of co-workers from the NITs Informatsiologii under the leadership of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Yu.L. Neymer. Falling in the sample were the enterprises of Moscow Oblast, as well as the cities of Kiev, Novosibirsk, Riga and Kharkov. A total of around 2,000 persons was questioned. The basic criterion for the choice of the enterprises was the presence at them of various new forms of management including leasehold, the first and second models of cost accounting. Before choosing the workers within the enterprise, the sample units were brought together into groups by vocational affiliation. There were five such groups or strata of workers belonging to vocations of unskilled, low-skilled, skilled and highly skilled labor and superior skill labor. For each stratum, a multilevel sampling was applied for five criteria: profession, skill, sex, age and education. The sampling was calculated considering the values of dispersion for the main indicators and these had a normal distribution in the general aggregate. Here we employed a formula of a nonrepeating random choice. Moreover, quality control of the sample was carried out and this warned of the rise of systematic errors in confusing information caused by the particular features in the distribution of the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents and by the missing of answers to certain questions in the questionnaire in filling them out.

Let us point out that under present-day production conditions, only an individual who has assumed an active position in life in perestroika can be considered socially mature. By an active position in life in the given instance, one

understands not only the verbal support for new ideas but actual activity aimed at realizing them in all spheres of life of the enterprise collective as well as in the social milieu surrounding the enterprise.

From this viewpoint, our research isolated three types of the individual's involvement in social ties and relations characterized by a sufficiently large spread of behavior strategies:

1. With satisfaction for the existing system of social relations, an individual naturally desires to stabilize these. Such persons and groups of people choose one out of three behavior strategies. The first is marked by energetic activities aimed at strengthening the existing system of social relations and combating those who would like to change this. The second strategy does not envisage energetic practical activities but rather is characterized by the verbal support of the individuals and groups who have chosen the first strategy for themselves. In both instances we are involved with an active position which opposes perestroika (activeness with a minus sign).

The third strategy is a passive one. The individuals which have chosen it do not disclose any particular activeness but sympathize with those who realize the first two strategies. The possibility of realizing the first two behavior strategies depends largely upon the tacit agreement of this third group.

In all these instances, the activities of the individuals and their groups are aimed at conserving the established way of life. At an enterprise they consciously impede the introduction of new progressive forms of management demanding a greater output from the employees, they retard the introduction of new equipment and progressive production methods and they prefer to work in the old style and not change anything in their collective. Any changes both in the sphere of production and in social life, regardless of whether they are progressive or not, evoke fear and resistance.

Such a character of involvement in social ties and relations, according to our hypothesis, indicates a low degree of SM. Subsequently, we will call this group "conservatives."

2. With dissatisfaction with the existing system of social relations, an individual endeavors to alter them. Here it is essential to examine two possible variations depending upon the nature of the changes. Those who desire a regressive change in social relations, for example, a return to the times of the cult of personality, evidence a low degree of SM regardless of the chosen behavior strategy. We will term such a group of persons below "reactionaries." On the contrary, those individuals and their groups which endeavor to make progressive changes in the system of social relations show a positive SM. Here it is also essential to isolate three behavior strategies.

The first of these is characterized by an implacable active struggle against everything which prevents a change in those elements of social relations which impede society's progress. These are the most active supporters of converting enterprises to new forms of management. Those who have chosen this behavior strategy are characterized by a high degree of SM and are designated by the term "fighters."

The second strategy envisages predominantly a verbal approbation of those who chose the first strategy and we term such workers "sympathizers."

The third behavior strategy marks individuals the activities of whom in support of perestroika is restricted to the limits of individual conscientious work. In all the rest, they merely sympathize with the fighters for perestroika. We designate this group by the term "easygoing" and assume that an average degree of SM is characteristic of them.

Such a position of the individuals and groups seeking progressive changes in society is characterized by an activeness with a plus sign.

3. It can also be assumed that in addition to the above-described two groups, there is also a statistically significant group of individuals who are indifferent to the existing system of social relations. These persons are characterized by a high degree of adaptability to any social relations. All their activities are directed at satisfying their personal needs and interests by any means with complete indifference to social values and goals. At individual stages of the struggle, motivated by interests of personal gain, they can provide verbal support and in certain instances active support for the actions of any of the above-described groups. This passive position is characterized, according to our hypothesis, by a social immaturity (SIM). To such a group we have assigned the term "morass."

It must be pointed out that this group is the most unpredictable, particularly in a stage of revolutionary changes in society. Its behavior depends upon the possibilities of satisfying narrow group or personal interests of its individual members. Precisely this group most often gives rise to dealers in the shadow economy, workers who abuse their official position, bribers, plunderers, shirkers and so forth.

Thus, the theoretically established five levels of social maturity reflect the entire spectrum of positions held by employees of industrial enterprises in relation to perestroika. The given scheme does not exclude the existence of intermediate groups without a clearly expressed position. However, an analysis of the obtained information has shown that the share of such persons at the enterprises is insignificant.

For working out the objective indicators for the level of SM and their further analysis, the primary information on the various aspects of the social conduct of employees was reduced to several generalizing indexes (factors) which, without losing their initial information, integrate it in a smaller number of variables. For compressing the information, factor analysis has been employed and this made it possible to reduce all the mutually correlated features to one composite index.

Factor analysis of the features characterizing the labor, political and moral maturity has shown that this can be uniformly described and interpreted with the help of two factors. These two factors explain almost 80 percent of the total dispersion of the analyzed primary features.

The first factor (a descriptive force of 57.4 percent) reflects the production activity of the employees and contains 11 features. The second (descriptive force of 22.4 percent) contains 10 features and characterizes the political and moral aspects of the individual's activities on and off the job. The features which do not make up the first two factors (their descriptive force is around 20 percent) have low factor loads and this does not make it possible to view them as a manifestation of the individual's SM.

An analysis of the behavior strategies of individuals, depending upon the level of satisfaction with the social system of social relations, has shown that, in terms of the level of SM, employees are distributed in the following manner (see Table 1).

Table 1: Distribution of Employees by Level of Social Maturity, %

Attitude Toward Existing System of Social Relations	Strategy of Behavior		
	Active Activity	Verbal Support of Actively Involved	Sympathy, Tacit Agreement
Satisfaction, desire for stability of existing situation	Low SM	Low SM	Low SM
	19.7	10.0	3.4
Dissatisfaction, desire for regressive changes	Extremely low SM	Extremely low SM	Extremely low SM
	8.3	4.4	4.7
Dissatisfaction, desire for progressive changes	High SM	Average SM	Average SM
	12.1	6.9	2.2
Indifferent to existing system of social relations	Social immaturity	Social immaturity	Social immaturity
	16.2	9.0	3.1

Here there are marked differences in the level of social maturity both between the workers and the white collar personnel as a whole, as well as between the representatives

of the various socioprofessional strata of workers and employee categories (see Table 2).

Table 2: Distribution of Employees by Social Maturity Level, %

Groups by SM Level	Employees (Total)	Workers	White Collar Personnel
Fighters	12.1	10.4	13.3
Easygoing and sympathetic	9.1	12.4	7.4
Conservatives	33.1	32.8	35.8
Morass	28.3	28.6	25.9
Reactionaries	17.4	15.8	17.6

Among the "fighter" workers (high SM), a majority is made up by employees engaged in professions of skilled and highly skilled labor (29.1 percent and 54.3 percent, respectively). These basically are employees 35-45 years of age, one-half of them has a specialized secondary and higher education. They are well acquainted with the problems of their enterprise (70 percent of them has been employed 10-15 years at the enterprise). Over one-half of the "fighter" workers feels himself to be the master not only of his own workplace but also the enterprise. They take an active part in social work as 30.5 percent are active CPSU members, 47.3 percent are engaged in trade union work or are members of the STK [labor collective council].

Among the white collar personnel, the highest number of "fighters" is found among specialists (18.4 percent), and they show high maturity both on the job and also in political life. The engineer-technical and scientific workers due to their education and previous upbringing have ended up being the most receptive to economic and political innovations. The groups involved in preparing and carrying out reforms at the enterprise must be formed precisely from these employees.

Among the "easygoing" and "sympathizers" there are most workers employed in skilled and low-skill labor (30.0 percent and 26.3 percent). Some 22.3 percent of them is also found among workers belonging to the professions of highly skilled labor, and one-half among the women specialists and technical executors. They, as a rule, are employees of the older ages (45-55 years) with a low level of education and culture. They are conscientious executors and on the job they are absolutely reliable without supervision, they maintain even comradely relations with all employees, they willingly collaborate on the job and they share experience and knowledge. In carrying out rush and complicated assignments, they do not hurry to offer their services but endeavor to remain in the shadows. They never criticize the leadership even if they do not agree with it. Indicatively, these workers do not endeavor to increase their output even with a rise in wages (75 percent in the group would not want to change its profession because of scientific-technical progress, 47 percent would not agree to mastering a profession with the same level of complexity as the previous one, and 15 percent of the employees would even leave the enterprise if they were offered a change in the content of labor). With a change in the economic situation at the enterprise, a portion of the "easygoing" and "sympathizers" could move into the camp of the "conservatives" or even the "reactionaries," as they would endeavor to maintain the

old orders whereby they would not have to change profession, raise labor productivity or assume responsibility in resolving production problems.

The "conservatives" (a low SM) make up one-third of the employees at the enterprises. Here are included representatives of all age and educational groups. Workers from vocations of low and unskilled labor comprise 48 percent of the group while those of skilled and highly skilled labor are 52 percent. Almost two-thirds of the employees in this group are satisfied with how their life has gone. They do not want to alter anything in it. Among all the values of life, they put the presence of a happy family in first place. They link the happiness of themselves and their family with their enterprise and with the position they hold there. Any changes in plant life, particularly a change in the economic status of the enterprise, would also entail changes in the life of the employees. Such a situation cannot help but alarm them and 61.3 percent of the employees actively resists the introduction of the new management forms, they refuse to learn the new equipment, to increase their vocational education and skills, and introduce disorganization into the social life of their collective. Basically these are males from 35 years and older with a family. The average earnings of the workers in this group lies in the interval of 250-300 rubles. Some 78 percent of the "conservatives" consider a transition of the enterprises to full cost accounting would lead to a situation where in their collectives the employees would develop a desire to obtain a better job to the detriment of others; some 63 percent that instances of an incorrect assessment of labor would become more frequent along with the unequal distribution of work between co-workers and an unjust distribution of bonuses. One-half of the "conservatives" is persuaded that sensitive, attentive relations and mutual aid have ceased to be the standard of conduct in the collective.

The highest share of "conservatives" is found among the foremen, the shop chiefs and the department heads with 48.3 percent. This shows that among the leaders there is a high share of those satisfied with their social status, position and profession. Any changes in the life of the enterprise and society can entail a change in their status and way of life. For this reason, many inferior-level leaders do not want radical changes but rather prefer slow advancement.

Since the "conservatives" make up around one-third of the employees of the enterprises, it is essential to think out measures to neutralize the resistance of this group to a transition to new management conditions. Such a mechanism should be based upon a knowledge of and satisfying the interests and needs of this group and establishing conditions under which the "conservatives" would not feel themselves encroached on.

The "morass" is the second most numerous group of employees. Characteristic of them is a complete indifference to everything going on in society, the region and the enterprise. All their activities are aimed at fully satisfying their personal needs and interests by any means. A majority in this category is made up of workers in unskilled and low-skill labor as well as technical executors among white collar personnel.

On the one hand, these are persons of prepension and pension age (50-65 years). The interests of the enterprise and the prospects of its development no longer concern them. The basic goal of their activity consists in obtaining material goods, the possibility of working calmly and without any particular effort. This group comprises around 43 percent of the socially immature workers. In terms of the style of their conduct, these employees gravitate to the "conservatives," and if in the course of introducing the new management mechanism their interests will be infringed on, they will actively defend them.

On the other hand, among the representatives of the "morass" is more than 37 percent of the youth (under the age of 25) employed in low-skill jobs. As a whole, they also are indifferent to the problems of the enterprise. Their personal interests lie outside the material sphere. The workers in this group are concerned by the prospects of their individual career and the possibility of obtaining a good profession and increasing their educational level. In social life they seek complete independence and are not afraid to show an affinity for unlikely judgments. Thus, the youth currently not holding a certain social position can become an active supporter and fighter for perestroika in the event that the enterprises establish all opportunities for the professional and political growth of the youth.

The remaining 20 percent of representatives from the "morass" is persons without an established position in life and for this reason an analysis here is difficult.

The "reactionaries" is the third, strongest force at the enterprise. Here are employed representatives of all the vocational and age groups but there is a predominance of 30-40-year-olds and women comprise 56 percent (as a total for the sample of the women, 42 percent).

Like the "fighters," the "reactionaries" are dissatisfied with the existing system of social relations and hold an active position vis-a-vis the restructuring of labor and political life at the enterprise. However, their activeness is aimed not at progressive changes but rather at returning to the orders of the times of totalitarianism. The "reactionaries" more often than the others prevent the fulfillment of the production quotas, they are guilty of producing damaged products, they violate production discipline and on the job put their personal interests foremost. In relations with comrades they are impolite and are involved in intrigues. They link all negative problems in the collective with the transition to the new management conditions. We consider the social maturity in this group to be extremely low.

The new economic mechanism and its selectiveness should become a means for combating such workers as there will be the inevitable discharge of not only the known loafers and violators of discipline, but also the simply weak, poorly trained workers. An efficient economy cannot be created by employees with a low skill level.

The research has succeeded in establishing a definite pattern in the distribution of the social values of employees in different groups by SM level (see Table 3). Some of these have equal value for a majority of the workers while others differ substantially.

Table 3: Distribution of Social Values by Degree of Importance in Assessment of Employees of Various Groups by SM Level

	Ranks					
	By Groups by SM Level					
	For Sample as Whole	Fighters	Easygoing and Sympathetic	Conservatives	Morass	Reactionaries
Happy family	1	1	8	1	1	1
Industrious, conscientious	2	2	5	2	2	7
Honesty, principledness, orderliness	3	10	7	3	3	6
Presence of good and reliable friends	4	6	9	4	4	8
Ability to take balanced, rational decisions	5	8	1	9	5	5
Concern for other persons	6	9	10	5	7	10
A great deal of money	7	7	2	7	8	2
Education, breadth of knowledge	8	3	6	6	6	9
High culture	9	4	4	8	9	3

Table 3: Distribution of Social Values by Degree of Importance in Assessment of Employees of Various Groups by SM Level (Continued)

	Ranks					
	By Groups by SM Level					
Interesting, creative job	10	5	3	10	10	4

From the table it can be seen that the most important social values for the workers are the presence of a happy family, good and reliable friends and such moral values as industriousness, conscientiousness, honesty, principledness and orderliness. The last three places are held by educational level, high culture and an interesting, creative job. Such a distribution of values in its mass shows that professional activities at the enterprise have ceased to be at the center of the interests of the individual, having given way to family and domestic values. There has been a drop in the prestige of high vocational skill and as a result a significant portion of the employees has lost the value of educational level, broad knowledge and creativity.

In the general scale of values, one is struck by the fact that the presence of a high wage was put by many employees in seventh place. Just 2 or 3 years ago, material values were viewed as the main ones by virtually all the enterprise employees. Such a change in the situation is explained not so much by the increased wages of the employees (these remain below the national average) as it is by the impossibility by working in social production to achieve material sufficiency for oneself and one's family.

The scale of values of the "conservatives" and the "morass" virtually does not differ from the scale for the entire sample. The representatives of these groups had a rather high view of educational level and breadth of knowledge (sixth place). This is due to the fact that among the "conservatives" there is a prevalence of middle-aged persons (35-45 years of age) and the structure of their values was formed during the years when the prestige of education was still rather high. Among the "morass" a majority is made up of low-skill workers with a low educational level, including workers from the professions of unskilled and low-skill labor and the technical executors. For them a rise in education is an opportunity to gain a more prestigious profession.

Characteristic of the "fighters" is an orientation toward educational level, breadth of knowledge and high culture. The "fighters" put in fifth place the creative character of their job (according to the entire sample, tenth place). As a whole, this group of employees is oriented predominantly at the meaningfulness and socially useful results of labor: 48 percent of them feel that it is worth working only where it is possible to bring greater benefit, some 72 percent value the honor of their enterprise and 76 percent feel that it is essential for everyone to be involved in the management of the shop, the department and the enterprise. Precisely for this type of employees, the new economic mechanism should create the best conditions of activity.

Among the "fighters" moral values held lower places on the scale. Possibly this is due to the fact that persons with an

active position in life, and which the "fighters" are, in reflecting on the moral aspect of their actions, correlate these primarily with social utility.

The "easygoing" and "sympathizers" are not supporters of energetic actions. For this reason they put in first place the ability to take well-conceived, rational decisions, in second place was high earnings which they want to obtain not by the intensification of labor and the mastery of more complicated professions, but rather by increasing payments, that is, they consider that their labor contribution is not adequately valued. Possibly they are correct. This group of employees is rather highly focused on the content of the labor and high culture. But here the overall passivity makes irresponsibility one of the main traits for the group as they have low regard for industriousness, conscientiousness, honesty, principledness and orderliness. For them concern for others, the happiness of the family and friendship stand in last place.

The "reactionaries" are oriented at the family and its material well-being. Everything else is for them the means of achieving these ends. They consider as important for themselves a creative job, high culture and the ability to take a well-conceived, rational decision. The "reactionaries" have a low regard for any manifestation of concern for others or the presence of friends. They consider industriousness, conscientiousness, honesty, orderliness and principledness to be completely nonobligatory.

Thus, each of the established groups has its own value structure in terms of the level of SM. A knowledge of priorities in the orientations of employee life with a varying SM level can be used in economic and educational work in the labor collectives. Such work should be aimed at increasing the interest of each worker in highly productive labor.

The process of converting the industrial enterprises to management under new economic conditions requires a definition of the social base for the changes. Such research makes it possible for the enterprise leadership to find the most painless ways for adapting the employees to the economic and technical innovations as well as anticipate possible social conflicts in the collectives.

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Forming the Social Maturity of an Individual

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[Article by Irina Ivanovna Polovinka, senior science associate at the Scientific Research Center [NITs] Informatsiologii [Sociology Information]. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The development of a socially mature individual is a complex and diverse process involving the rise and resolution of contradictions between the individual and society, that is, their reciprocal adaptation. A particular place is held by resolving the contradiction between the values declared by society and the behavior which is actually beneficial for the individual. This (the contradiction) is formed primarily in the system of social institutions which perform important functions in the society. A person enters the sphere of social production basically as a formed individual, however the process of his formation does not end here. In spending a third of his creative life on the job and in linking definite social expectations to the job, a person like it or not falls into the vortex of social processes occurring in the production sphere, he enters numerous social relations and as a result of this he himself changes and has an influence on others and through them on the entire production environment, no matter how infinitely small this influence might be.

Changes in the range of qualities needed by an employee and which are entailed in the transforming of management conditions has of yet not been fully assessed. The intensity of these changes depends, on the one hand, upon the depth of the changes themselves and, on the other, on an awareness of them by those who must change.

An analysis of the economic situation of the enterprises where the research¹ was done, in studying the problems of forming the social maturity of the employees, has shown that the introduction of models I and II of cost accounting did not entail substantial changes for the labor collectives in the economic mechanism. We feel that the flaw in the given forms of management must be sought in the little involvement of the employees in the ownership relations and which did not go beyond the limits of the use and good management of state (and not one's own but rather others) property.

The changes involved in a lease can be considered the more radical. These are caused by a definite freedom in management and given to the labor collectives. However, the main thing in the changes which a lease entails is the preparation of the employees for greater involvement in property relations from the good management of the property to its possession.

In the opinion of the workers at the enterprises where the research was carried out, the introduction of models I and II of cost accounting had led to definite improvements in the various elements of the labor situation. However, the intensity of these changes was in no comparison with those changes which would have been entailed in a transition of the labor collective to lease relations (see Table 1).

Table 1: Share of Respondents Who Feel That Because of Change in Management Conditions There Have Been Noticeable Changes for the Better in Their Job, % of Total Number of Persons Questioned

Improved Elements of Labor Situation	For Enterprises Operating Under Models I and II of Economic Accountability	At Least Enterprises
Amount of wage	28.3	56.4
Quality of work	21.8	41.7
Relations with immediate leader (foreman, brigade leader and so forth)	21.7	32.7
Assessment of worker's labor by leader	18.5	29.8
Possibility of improving skills	13.2	22.9
Shift conditions, work hours	12.3	26.7
Supply with materials and tools	11.0	21.2
Sanitary and hygienic working conditions	9.7	25.1

With a change in the management conditions in the labor collectives, there has been a rise in mutual help and a general interest in working at full force, and to a larger degree there is a desire to work with high quality and a desire to improve

skills, vocational mastery and so forth (see Table 2). The presence of such changes is extremely significant for the fate of innovations as this shows their effectiveness.

Table 2: Opinions of Respondents on Changes in Collective With Change in Management Conditions

Type of Changes	Proportional Amount of Respondents Feeling That in the Collective the Below-Listed Changes Have Occurred, % of Total Number of Persons Questioned	
	For Collectives Operating Under Models I and II of Cost Accounting	At Leased Collectives
Desire has appeared to work qualitatively	49.8	64.2
Concern has appeared among employees for increased prestige of enterprise	49.8	62.9
Greater desire of collective members to improve their skills and professional mastery	39.8	60.1
Interest has appeared in state of affairs on the job	44.7	53.4

Table 2: Opinions of Respondents on Changes in Collective With Change in Management Conditions (Continued)

Type of Changes	Proportional Amount of Respondents Feeling That in the Collective the Below-Listed Changes Have Occurred, % of Total Number of Persons Questioned	
	For Collectives Operating Under Models I and II of Cost Accounting	At Leased Collectives
There is a greater interest of the collective members to work at full force	37.7	53.3
Mutual aid has increased	38.3	45.6
Proposals have begun to be submitted more often on improving production	25.2	33.9

The research carried out on this level has provided promising results. It was established that the quality characteristics of the employees give way to effects and progressive change in the event of even insignificant reorganizations in the management conditions. From our viewpoint there is every reason to hope that the more radical changes in this area will accelerate the process of improving the quality of the labor force and this to a definite degree will influence a rise in employee social maturity.

Undoubtedly, we must learn to manage the process of forming the social maturity of an individual, however an analysis of the given concept is still just in the initial stage. In order to know what controlling actions are effective and would lead to the achieving of the desired result, it is essential to know what factors, to what degree and in what manner have an impact upon the nature of an individual's involvement in the real social ties and relations and, consequently, on his behavior.

We have been able to isolate five most essential features and in accord with these the primary factors can be split into a number of groups. Each of these groups differs from the others and, as a consequence of this, requires the use of different methods of action. Certainly, the classification proposed below, like any other, is not devoid of a certain conditionality. However, precisely such an approach makes it possible to take a new look at the process of shaping the social maturity of an individual.

As the classification principles, we chose the degree, mechanism, direction and nature of the influence of the factor on social maturity as well as the nature of the perception of surrounding reality by the individual. For assessing the level of social maturity, the author developed an indicator reflecting the behavior characteristics of the employee, his satisfaction with the entire range of relations in the collective and the direction of activity (assistance, resistance to the progressive development of society or a neutral position). Each of the indicator levels has a fixed numerical value and corresponds to a certain behavior strategy. The closeness of the correlation is the criterion for putting the primary factor in one or another group in accord with the given classification principle. In the conducted research for assessing the latter, we used a Pearson correlation coefficient (C_p) between the value of the feature and the calculated level of social maturity.

In accord with the given criterion, the primary factors were divided into six groups of which the first three had the

strongest influence on the examined indicator. Thus, the first group included the features which to the greatest degree influenced social maturity. These included education, complexity of labor, the amount of wages with bonuses and so forth. The values of the correlation coefficients (C_p) in this group varied within limits from 0.201 to 0.170. It must be pointed out that the social maturity level was assessed by a synthetic indicator including 17 parameters. Their influence on the studied indicator was not uniform and worked in different directions and for this reason the obtaining of a high value for the correlation coefficients was from the outset little probable.

Among the factors which also affect the level of social maturity to a significant degree and which form the second closest group one could put those the correlation coefficients of which with the examined indicator comprise from 0.169 to 0.140. This group includes the professional training of the individual, the length of his employment and so forth.

Among the features of the third group which influence the social maturity level of the workers to a moderate degree are those for which the correlation coefficients are within the limits of from 0.139 to 0.120. This group includes the presence for the employees of an opportunity to take decisions independently in the process of their work, the response in the labor collective to criticism and so forth.

Among those affecting to a slight (weak) degree one could put such variables as age, the importance of the profession's prestige for the employees and so forth. The amount of the correlation coefficients between the listed factors and the level of social maturity varies in this fourth group within the interval from 0.119 to 0.110.

This same group includes the factor which is very popular in sociological research of the "feeling of being the boss." Its weak linkage with the social maturity level is explained by the fact that the research included individuals which differed little in terms of the nature of involvement in property relations and at present virtually did not experience this feeling; the concept itself requires a clearer definition. We feel that in studying persons who work under the conditions of cooperative, stock or private property, the amount of the correlation tie between the designated factor and the social maturity level will be weightier.

The analysis also made it possible to disclose a large number of variables which do not directly influence or insignificantly influence the social maturity level. Among these one could put nationality, party affiliation (membership in the

(CPSU) and a whole number of other features the correlation coefficients of which with the studied indicator are extremely low. In the given instance there is every reason to assume that the effect on the social maturity level of the individual using these factors will be ineffective.

Among the variables which make up the first three groups in terms of the degree of impact on the social maturity level, that is, those most closely linked to the given indicator, there is a predominance of those which do not depend upon the awareness of the employees, that is, objective ones. These include education, the belonging of the employee to a socioprofessional stratum, the amount of earnings and so forth.

The subjective factors possess a qualitatively different mechanism of action on the individual as these are the result of the perception and reflection of various objective processes and phenomena in the mind of the employees. For example, not the amount of wages but rather the satisfaction of the employees with this can serve as one of the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the labor incentive system operating at the enterprise. There are frequent instances when a comparatively small wage is seen by the employees as completely acceptable. In actuality, the average monthly wage of the respondents at the Riga Electrical Equipment Plant was 275 rubles, and the satisfaction index with the amount of earnings was a minus (-0.967), while the corresponding parameters for those questioned at the Naro-Fominsk Electrical Insulating Materials Plant equaled, respectively, 290 rubles and 0.144, at the Kharkov Electrical Machinery Plant 247 rubles and 0.023, and at the Kiev Relay and Automation Plant 237 rubles and 0.105 (the correlation coefficient between the amount of wages and the satisfaction index with this element of the labor situation was 0.117 and for the features of such a level this cannot be considered significant).

Thus, an increase in wages, as incidentally has been repeatedly pointed out by specialists, brings only a partial increase in employee satisfaction with the given element of the labor situation. Research has shown that not a rise in earnings but rather greater justice in their distribution and better working conditions are capable of having a substantial effect on employee satisfaction with the amount of earnings. The given example shows that precisely an impact on the subjective factors can lead to effective changes in the labor situation at the enterprise, although their impact may not be felt immediately but only after a certain time, and may last for an extended period after the actual action. This circumstance must be taken into account in adopting managerial decisions.

The research has shown that certain features may virtually have no direct impact on the social maturity level of the individual, however their influence can be realized indirectly, through other features. Thus, the prospect of an increase in wages is virtually not tied to the social maturity level of the employees, however this feature does influence employee satisfaction with relationships with the immediate leader and this ultimately has a strong impact on the level of the investigated indicator. It is all the more important to bring out such features as their impact is hidden from the eyes of those who control employee conduct. An underestimation of the influence of the features which indirectly

effect the social maturity level can lead to unexpected consequences for the management, and be felt in a completely different area than the leaders figured. The predominant number of factors only within the confines of a mathematical model are independent variables but in actuality are related by diverse ties to other factors and the dependent variable, the social maturity level. In the process of management, it is essential to consider that a change in each of these has to one degree or another not only an impact on the function as a whole, but also like an echo or "backwave" is reflected on this same independent variable as well as on a whole series of others the effect on which was not planned. Thus, a change in the response to criticism in the labor collective, as a rule, means changes in the social maturity level of the employees (the correlation coefficient is 0.124), but at the same time, a change in the response to criticism involves changes in employee satisfaction with relations in the collective, with the justice of wages and the sanitary and hygienic working conditions.

For increasing the probability of obtaining the effect expected as a result of carrying out management actions, it is important to know the direction of the factor's influence on the social maturity level. A majority of the factors is related to the latter by a direct link (the correlation coefficient is positive). For example, with a move from the lower socioprofessional strata to the higher and with greater complexity of the work of the employees, the significance of the indicator also rises. However, there is a significant group of factors for which the correlation coefficient with the dependent variable is negative. Thus, with a higher social maturity level there is lower importance for the professional prestige considerations of the employees. In carrying out a managing action, it is extremely important to know in what manner it ultimately will be felt. In this context a manager's knowledge of the direction of the ties between the features can free him from unexpected and unpleasant surprises.

Footnote

1. The research in which the author took a direct part was carried out by the forces of co-workers from the NITs Informatsiologii under the leadership of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu.L. Neymer. A description of the research has been provided in the article by Yu.L. Neymer and T.A. Slyusareva "Characters in the Play Entitled 'Perestroika'" (No 3, 1991).

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Can the Market Revive the Countryside?

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[Article by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Razumov, candidate of economic sciences and head of the Standard of Living Department at the Scientific Research Labor Institute of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The implementing of a radical economic reform the basic aim of which is to move to a market-type economy for

now has raised more questions than it has provided answers. One of the central questions is whether the new relations in agriculture will be able to provide maximum emancipation for the producer and create the conditions for highly efficient labor and the possibility in the foreseeable future of finally feeding the people sufficiently?

A Change in Priorities Is Essential

The complexity of the situation is that the time has come to give up the stereotype which has been formed over recent decades and according to which the people are primarily a labor resource, manpower, and only then an aggregate of individuals, the main and ultimate consumer of the goods created and for the sake of whom production is carried out. In this sense, the rural inhabitants must be viewed not as a means of realizing all sorts of plans but rather as the principal of management, considering that the countryside has development patterns which are particular and internally inherent to precisely it, and the ignoring of these, let alone attempts to break them up, have already led to lamentable results and one of them is the food crisis. The potential of our nation in food production is virtually unlimited.

At present, there is no longer any doubt that one of the main failings in the existing system of planned management is the centrally set proportions for the exchange of labor results between city and countryside as these have not taken into account the real economic ties. As a result, a portion of national income created in agriculture is realized in the form of a turnover tax and profit in the food and light industries (that is, in the urban sectors of the national economy). The assessments of the scale of the redistribution of national income between city and countryside, depending upon the calculating method, differ substantially. But the fact remains that more resources are removed from the countryside than are given back in return.

This is caused basically by two factors. The first is the steady migration from the countryside to the city as a result of which expenditures on upbringing, education and vocational-skill training are borne by the countryside while income from the realization of the labor potential of the persons leaving the countryside goes to the city. The second factor is the scissors in the prices for industrial and agricultural products when the products of agricultural labor become ever-cheaper in comparison with industrial ones. According to the estimates of the Scientific Research Price Institute in 1969, a rural producer sold to the state approximately 6 kg of meat for 1 hp of capacity in purchased agricultural equipment and now the figure is around 10 kg. In 1975, a peasant sold approximately 150-200 liters of milk to purchase women's boots and now the figure is 300-500 liters (depending upon the zone of residence) [1].

The imbalance in the economic relations naturally led to a lag in the standard of living of the rural population. Here inequality in the production sphere was heightened by the state distribution policy. This involves a majority of the social standards, the amount of investment into the nonproductive sphere and much else. As a result, the reproduction of inequality in the standard of living continues even now. Here are certain examples.

Unvarnished Prosperity

A predominant share of the housing (over 70 percent of the total area) is made available to urban dwellers, even considering the housing construction cooperatives, using state capital investments, that is, virtually gratis. Only 30 percent of such housing goes to the share of the rural inhabitants [2, p 116]. The unequal conditions in obtaining housing are intensified by the unequal conditions of operations. As is known, expenditures for the upkeep of individual housing are completely the burden of its owners. As a result, a predominant share of the state subsidies goes to the city. According to our data, this figure calculated per average urban family reaches 200 rubles a year. The inequality is increased also due to the extremely low level of amenities in the rural housing as equipment with water supply, sewage and gas is 2-5-fold lower [2, p 116].

Wages in agriculture are almost a quarter less. Here the differentiation has increased over the years of carrying out the economic reform (that is, since 1988). Even the increasing amount of income from the private farm cannot compensate for the drop in the standard of living.

The rural population receives only one-half the amount of the urban in terms of the quantity of social services provided from the public consumption funds. The smaller the village the poorer the physical plant of its sociocultural sphere. Thus, children in 27 percent of the population points with a population from 300 to 500 persons do not have the opportunity to study in schools directly at their place of residence and the same is true for 11 percent of the population points with over 500 persons. Some 25 percent of the inhabitants is deprived of the opportunity of obtaining any medical aid in their villages. If there are fewer than 100 inhabitants, then only in 1 out of every 5 villages is there a first aid station, a library and a club, and only 1 in 20 has nurseries and creches [2, p 116]. There is an analogous situation in realizing monetary income: 6 percent of the population cannot purchase vital necessities at their place of residence, 21-25 percent have no domestic services and 18 percent cannot use the services of communications departments or attend the movies [3, pp 156, 157].

The rural population has available much less of the various benefits than in the city. Here we mean benefits to pay for housing, obtaining children's food, food orders, distributing scarce items and so forth. City residents also predominantly benefit from the price advantages (for children's goods, medicines and foodstuffs sold at the state retail prices and so forth). Such inequality leads essentially to the exploitation of the countryside. However, this, as was already mentioned above, is not the fault of the urban dwellers but rather the shortcomings of the current economic mechanism.

Directions for the Social Restructuring of the Countryside

Here several possibilities can be seen. The task of the state is not so much one of redistributing a portion of the created product in favor of the countryside as it is one of creating conditions there for social development and for a higher standard of living. In the relations between city and countryside it is essential to move toward a policy of social partnership and from this viewpoint examine the thesis which has

been constantly preached in our nation of overcoming the substantial differences between city and countryside. It is time to realize that it is a matter of the varying significance and values in the social standards of residing in urban and rural localities but in no instance is it one of their identicalness. In terms of certain standards the village must be brought closer to the city and for others the city closer to the village. As a result, both ways of life will have their own attractiveness and objectively caused advantages for living there.

How can this be carried out in practice? Here there are two possible ways. The first is the more efficient use of the assets being channeled into agriculture and a redistribution of capital investments from the production sphere into the nonproductive. Currently, the large funds being invested in agriculture have little impact on the prosperity of the people. Moreover, a portion of their wages carries out the functions not inherent to wages of compensating for the bad working and living conditions and for the significant lag in the social infrastructure.

Another way is to seek out additional investments for the social development of the countryside by the more efficient and rational use of resources in the other economic sectors. This, for example, would mean the gradual elimination of enterprises operating at a loss, the conversion of defense sectors and so forth. Gigantic reserves are also to be found in the multibillion amounts of the payment of unearned wages, in uninstalled imported equipment and losses of what has been already produced.

There still are many uncertainties in the housing problem. Here two questions are natural: At whose expense should amenities be provided and what should the level be? An attempt is being made already to resolve the first of these by those farms where the houses are being put up by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes with the financial and material support of the state with the subsequent turning over of the housing to the employees. Here it is essential to conclude a legally valid contract which reflects the obligations of the party in the event of the dismissal of the employee. From 1980 through 1988, the kolkhozes increased housing construction at their own expense from 4.9 to 7.3 million m², that is, by 1.5-fold [4, p 150].

At the same time, housing construction in the countryside drawing on internal funds in the foreseeable future will remain the crucial direction for satisfying the needs of the rural population for this very important vital good.

Recently the state has adopted a series of measures encouraging such a form of settlement, including eliminating all the previous decisions which had restricted the development of individual housing construction. Moreover, rural inhabitants can obtain a credit for building individual housing with outbuildings totaling up to 20,000 rubles and a repayment period of 50 years [5]. Another form of specific credit has been introduced for the reconstruction and major overhaul of individual housing, for connecting them to utility networks, for erecting outbuildings for keeping livestock and poultry and for storing agricultural products. The conditions are up to 4,000 rubles with a repayment over 10 years, beginning from the third year [6].

We feel that the construction of individual housing must be included in the development plans of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and taken into account in the social development plans of the territories. The industrial enterprises of the rayons and oblasts as well should participate in this by making specific deductions of a portion of the profit into the budget of the local soviets. The benefit will be reciprocal. If the villager is helped in building his own house, he himself or his children will not be likely to become migrants. In this manner it is possible to halt the process of the aging of the peasantry.

For returning the succession of generations it is also essential to make provision for a procedure for passing on housing to heirs. At present, children (or other heirs) in obtaining a house are obliged to pay a significant state fee. We feel that this is unjust. It would be better either to completely give up such a tax or substantially reduce it but under the condition that the heirs will work in agriculture.

Very promising directions in providing amenities to the rural farmstead are opened up by developing and industrially producing dependable and efficient systems for independent heat supply, central gas supply and so forth. It is a pleasure to know that here the first moves have already been made. Thus, in Ulyanovsk the Ulyanovskskagrospeksmon-tazh [Ulyanovsk Special Agricultural Installation] Trust has developed and organized production of original compact boiler plants designed for heat supply of 50 houses in the countryside. The power of the boiler plant can be boosted by adding additional boiler units. While the cost of building a standard boiler plant in the countryside, as a rule, exceeds 150,000 rubles, expenditures on the production and installation of this one are not over 45,000. It takes 1 or 2 weeks for assembly and the plans make provision for various types of fuel, including gas and mazut [2, p 116].

The next problem which also with every right could be put in first place is the construction of roads and without fail with a high grade hard surface. For this it is essential to pool the forces of all the involved parties including the state, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, consumer cooperatives, leaseholders, farmers and industrial enterprises. The working out of a specific integrated Rural Roads Program would aid in the quickest carrying out of the task. Leadership and financing of it should be entrusted to the various ranks of soviets. The financing method should consist, in our view, in the specific accumulating of a portion of the profit from the production and economic units located on the territory under the local soviets.

A separate word must be said on the need for the more rapid development and improved work of public transport, the organizing of convenient communications between the rural and urban population points and the coordinating of traffic schedules so that the people would spend as little time as possible in traveling.

What to Expect From the Market

In line with the change in economic policy, the questions naturally arise of how the transition to a market will influence relations between city and countryside and will this help to solve the above-listed problems relating to the

social development of the countryside? Without claiming a monopoly of the truth in the last question and considering that exhaustive statistical information will not appear sooner than after several years, we would like to voice certain fundamental considerations on this issue.

The modern market is a harsh and even a cruel economic system which is regulated by the state and for this reason it must not be identified with anarchy. In it individual types of production and forms of property are placed under conditions of acute competition and struggle for a consumer and in accord with the results of this struggle are ranked in the appropriate economic niches. The basic purpose in moving to market relations is by competition to create conditions for highly efficient production. Only on this basis is it possible to achieve a substantial rise in the production volumes, lower product costs and, consequently, product prices. The state and its enterprises in this system must play the role of a "social shock absorber" which neutralizes the negative consequences.

One of the assumed results of the transition to market relations is a significant broadening of commodity-monetary exchange between city and countryside. Reciprocal incorporation of one another in the consumer system, and economic stimulation of the old and new selling markets (when industry is oriented at rural inhabitants, producing the appropriate means of production and consumer articles and agriculture is focused on the city dweller, supplying raw materials and food products) should quite naturally lead to an increase in the production volumes and exchange between the national economic sectors. Market relations clearly define precisely which commodities are needed by the city and which by the countryside.

There must also be a deepening of our comprehension and even a certain rethinking of the law of distribution according to labor. Labor will be judged by the final results confirming its utility by demand on the market and for this reason will be paid for at a price which depends upon supply and demand. Individual production costs (the quantity and quality of labor spent on the specific type of product) will lose its dominant importance as the criterion for wages.

The rural inhabitants have most likely the greatest susceptibility to introducing market relations. This is due to the fact that they have kept a stronger feeling of the owner of the products produced by them. Let me give just one example: 98 percent of the kolkhoz families and 79 percent of the families of the workers and white collar personnel residing in rural localities have a private farm and, consequently, obtain income from it [7, p 3]. The maintaining of a market psychology has been aided by the sale of a portion of this product in the nonstate sector at prices which are formed depending upon supply and demand. As a whole, agriculture is monopolized to a much lesser degree than industry and for this reason it is easier for those employed there to assimilate new economic behavior.

The transition to a market will be reflected on the rural inhabitants to a lesser degree due to the availability of food products, when the prospect of a price increase would hang like a sword of Damocles over the remaining population.

Self-sufficiency in products from the private farmsteads (approximately one-half), an increase in the barter form of wage and the opportunity to purchase directly on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes will substantially mitigate the transition to the new relations.

At the same time, the rural population will be one of the last protected groups from the viewpoint of the guaranteed receiving of socially significant services (education and public health). The duties of the state include providing social protection, particularly for children and pensioners living in rural localities.

On the Threshold of Transition (Assessing Certain Trends)

The economic reform which began in 1988 makes it possible for us even now to draw certain definite conclusions. In the first place, the group selfishness of the industrial and agricultural enterprises is becoming evermore apparent. One of these manifestations has been the excessive jacking up of prices in the aim of increasing profit. Undoubtedly, this is a result of the monopoly situation of the enterprises. Inflating prices for the product produced makes it possible to increase the collective's wage fund while a rise in the purchasing prices for agricultural products still lags significantly behind.

The violations of price parity further exacerbate the problem of the equivalence of exchange in the results of economic activity between city and countryside, leading to the unjustified flow of money from agriculture into other economic sectors and this strongly reduces the opportunities for social development of the rural settlements. In order to maintain this parity, the countryside is forced to raise prices for food products and raw materials. This is often done to the detriment of a state order. In order to sell their products more dearly, the leaders of the agricultural enterprises are beginning to sell an ever-larger share of the product through the consumer cooperatives and on the kolkhoz market. These are the sprouts of a market mechanism for self-adjustment and maintaining price parity. In order not to let the situation out of control, in 1990, the government adopted a decision on a substantial rise in state purchasing prices for the most important types of agricultural products (grain, livestock and poultry). However, this will not produce a long-term effect and sooner or later will be absorbed by the rise in contractual and free prices for industrial products.

If the economic reform develops in such a direction, this will merely lead to the intensifying of the inflationary spiral and nothing more. For example, the consumer cooperatives will be forced to raise prices for the products purchased from the population and retail prices for products going for sale. Prices on the kolkhoz market of course will respond at a more rapid pace. According to the data of the USSR State Statistical Committee, in 1990, prices increased by almost one-quarter [8].

One further distinguishing feature of the transition to the market has been, no matter how paradoxical this may seem, a bartering of products between the collectives of the industrial and agricultural enterprises and the organizing of their own sort of barter deals. In our country there have been frequent instances when kolkhozes and sovkhozes directly

exchange meat, potatoes, tomatoes, apples and so forth for metal mesh, piping and equipment. However, it is well known to the economists that a direct exchange of products marks a step away from the market where money must play the role of the intermediary in the buying and selling process.

For neutralizing the negative consequences, it is essential to provide state regulation of the transition to the market. This applies both to creating a mechanism for balanced economic relations between city and countryside, the balance development of industry and agriculture, and the establishing and maintaining of an economically sound differentiation in the incomes of the urban and rural population. Primary here are decentralizing the channels for the exchange of labor product; the employment of state regulators of the market processes (creating the appropriate taxation systems, crediting, and so forth); the adoption and realization of effective antimonopoly legislation. Of particular significance is the forming of a unified production and social infrastructure of the city and countryside. This will be a most important factor in providing the social protection of the rural population. It is also essential to revise the minimal and rational consumer budgets for the differing size and composition of rural families residing in various regions. It is a question of more fully considering in the consumer baskets the essential material goods and services as well as the growing inflationary processes.

An important direction should also be the creating of an effectively operating and legally based mechanism for the rural producers who chose their forms of management. Thus, in Russia alone, drawing on unused lands as well as the inefficiently used lands in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, it would be possible to establish 400,000-500,000 peasant farms [9]. Their appearance inevitably would lead to a demand for miniequipment, including tractors, motorized mowers, units for preparing feed, small-sized freight-passenger vehicles and trucks, three-wheeled freight motorcycles and so forth.

However, the production of good quality equipment may not keep pace with the occurring structural changes. Thus, in 1988, the nation produced a total of 84,000 low-power orchard and garden tractors and motorized cultivators, while the output of such equipment was: 1,316,000 units in China, 379,000 in the United States and 277,000 in Japan [4, p 676]. An important task for the state is to locate the orders for such equipment over the industrial enterprises and encourage its output (providing credit benefits, reducing tax rates and so forth).

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